The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code by Cuevas, Carlos J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1994
The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory
Construction and the Bankruptcy Code
Carlos J. Cuevas
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 435 (1994)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/9
THE REHNQUIST COURT, STRICT STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
CARLOS J. CUEVAS 1
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 436
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND STRICT STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION ..................................... 439
A. Strict Statutory Construction Has Become the
Significant Mode of Statutory Construction in the
Rehnquist Court .............................. 439
B. The Rehnquist Court, Plain Meaning and the Code ... 440
C. Holistic Statutory Construction .................. 444
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION .... 448
A. Public Choice Theory ........................... 448
B. Legislative Supremacy .......................... 452
C. The Enforcement of Bankruptcy Policy ............. 454
D. Reliance on Legislative History Can Be Dubious ..... 455
E. Predictability and Reliability ..................... 461
F. Strict Statutory Construction Is Consistent with
Commercial Law Policy ......................... 464
G. Strict Statutory Construction Precludes a
Bankruptcy Court from Using its Equitable
Powers to Disregard the Clear Provisions of
the Code ..................................... 466
H. Strict Statutory Construction Prevents a
Bankruptcy Court from Employing its Equitable
Powers to Create Substantive Rights .............. 467
L Congressional Action Can Remedy Unpopular
or Incorrect Decisions .......................... 470
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF STRICT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ... 473
lAssociate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., New York University,
1979; J.D., Yale, 1982. The author is grateful to Leonard Baynes, Edward Purcell, Jr., and
Edward Samuels for reviewing earlier drafts of this paper. Wendy Reyes, Luis Diaz and
Richard J-J. Manchester provided research assistance. The author also is grateful for the
assistance of Dean Harry H. Wellington and a research grant provided by New York
Law School.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
A. Introduction .................................. 473
B. Plain Meaning Can Produce Horrendous
Results Because the Court Is Constrained to
Ignore the Policy Implications of its Decision ........ 473
C. Strict Statutory Interpretation May Produce
Absurd Results ............................... 475
D. Strict Statutory Construction May Inhibit the
Development of Bankruptcy Law and Policy ......... 477
E. Congress May Be Slow or Fail to Respond to a
Problem that a Decision Has Created .............. 482
F. Context Is Necessary for Interpretation of Statutes .... 484
G. A nalysis ..................................... 486
V. PLAIN MEANING SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHEN THERE IS A
PRECISE STATUTE GOVERNING THE ISSUE, THE ISSUE IS A
STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKRUPTCY LAW ISSUE AND PUBLIC
POLICY Is NOT INVOLVED ............................ 487
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................... 493
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade witnessed a substantial outpouring of scholarship on
bankruptcy law. Scholars have toiled to develop theories concerning the
function and operation of bankruptcy and corporate reorganization in our
society.2 The bankruptcy literature has tended to focus on the theoretical
justifications for corporate reorganizations. 3 Although bankruptcy law is pre-
2 E.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986);
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Value: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 717 (1991); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith
Filing Requirement: Sentinel ofan Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919 (1991);
James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory
and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990); Thomas H. Jackson
& Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the
Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and
the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L. J. 857 (1982).
3 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 729;
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.
J. 1043 (1992); Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justificationfor Corporate Reorganizations,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117 (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for
Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986).
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dominately statutory, until recently there has been relatively little discussion
regarding the interpretation of bankruptcy statutes.4
In the last ten years there has also been a revival of statutory interpretation
scholarship,5 and different scholars have proposed different theories for how
courts should interpret statutes.6 The statutory interpretation literature has
generated an important debate regarding the legislative process and the
manner in which courts should interpret statutes. The statutory interpretation
scholarship offers major insights into how the Supreme Court addresses, or
should address, statutory interpretation issues.
The Supreme Court has addressed numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.7 Although many of the issues before the Supreme Court involving the
4 See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of
Cognate Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L. J. 335 (1994); Thomas G. Kelch, An ApologyforPlain-MeaningInterpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 289 (1994);Robert
K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 535 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, M, Literalism: The United
States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's
Evolving "Plain Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV.
1636 (1993); CharlesJ. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions:
The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSEL. REV. 823 (1991); Adam
J. Winsch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment ofPre-Bankruptcy Code
Law, 79 GEO. L. J. 1831 (1991); Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme
Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477 (1988).
5 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
StatutoryInterpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
6See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FORTHE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)(courts
should overrule antiquated statutes); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean:
Updating Statutory Interpretation 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988)(nautical statutory
interpretation); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988)(textualism); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 543 (1988)(collaborative model);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987)(dynamic statutory interpretation); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975)(public
choice theory).
711 U.S.C. § 101-1501 (1988 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter the Code]. The following are
a list of the more important Supreme Court decisions involving bankruptcy: Rake v.
Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187(1993)(an oversecured mortgagee is entitled to postpetition interest
when a debtor cures a defaulted mortgaged pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan); Nobelman
v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993)(a debtor may not bifurcate the claim of an
undersecured residential mortgagee in a Chapter 13 plan); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993)(an inadvertent late filing of a proof of
claim constitutes excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9006(b)(1)); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992)(an ERISA pension plan could
be excluded from a bankruptcyestatepursuant to § 541(c)(2) Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992) (exemption by declaration)); Bamhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386
(1992)(a transfer made by check is completed under§ 547(b) when the bank has accepted
the check); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992)(under Judicial
19941
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Code have focused on creditor-debtor issues, the Supreme Court has not
followed any recognizable "ideology" in deciding bankruptcy issues.8 Rather,
the determinative issue in Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions is the method
of statutory interpretation that is utilized.
The predominant method of statutory interpretation used by the Supreme
Court has been strict statutory construction. Under strict statutory construction
the Court will employ the plain meaning rule which emphasizes that the
answer to a bankruptcy issue should be resolved by analyzing the text of the
Code Section 1292(b) an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court can be appealed to
a Circuit Court of Appeals); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)(a debtor may not
use § 506(d) to strip down an undersecured mortgagee's claim in a Chapter 7 case);
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991)(payments on long term debt can satisfy the
ordinary course of business exception contained in § 547(c)(2)); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157 (1991)(under§ 109 an individual without an ongoing business maybe a Chapter
11 debtor); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991)(an individual may
immediately file for Chapter 13 after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge); Owen v. Owen,
500 U.S. 305 (1991)(a judicial lien can be eliminated under § 522(f), even though state
law permitted the lien to impair the exemption); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291
(1991)(a debtor may not use § 522(f) to avoid a judicial lien that was placed on his
residence as part of a divorce decree); Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279 (1991)(the correct
standard of proof concerning the discharge of a debt pursuant to Bankruptcy 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) is the preponderance of the evidence); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53
(1990)(prepetition trust fund payments are not preferences); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub.
Welfarev. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)(a Chapter13 debtorwas entitled to a discharge
of a criminal restitution obligation); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235
(1989)(a nonconsensual oversecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest under §
506(b)); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988)(the absolute priority
rule under § 1129(b) prohibits a debtor from retaining a equity interest under a
reorganization plan when the debtor is solely going to contribute his expertise and
labor); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)(an
undersecured creditor is not entitled topostpetition interest); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S.
36 (1986)(a Chapter 7 debtor may not discharge a criminal restitution obligation);
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986)(a
trustee may not use 11 U.S.C. § 554 to abandon an environmental waste site in
contravention of state and local health and safety laws); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)(a bankruptcy trustee controls the
attorney-client privilege in a Chapter 7 case); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
(1984) (collective bargaining agreement could be rejected pursuant to § 365(a), the
burden of proof for rejecting a collective bargaining agreement was the balance of the
equities; and a debtor did not commit an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally
modified a collective bargaining agreement); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462
U.S. 198 (1983)(a Chapter 11 debtor could use§ 542(a) to obtain property thatbeen seized
by the IRS); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982)(the structure of the bankruptcy court system was unconstitutional).
8 One commentator has stated:
Not only does the Court fail to rely on bankruptcy policy expressly in
any of its opinions, but it also is readily apparent that the Court's textualist
approach is not a mask for a 'hidden agenda' in the bankruptcy area. The
Court reaches results that are universally consistent with any theory of
bankruptcy law. Some results comport with the economic account of
bankruptcy law, while others coincide with the traditional explanation.
Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 565.
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particular provision that governs the subject matter. If a particular provision is
unclear or there is no specific provision that governs a particular problem, then
the Supreme Court will engage in holistic statutory interpretation. Under
holistic statutory interpretation the Court will attempt to derive an answer to
a bankruptcy question by analyzing the entire Code and render an
interpretation, which is harmonious with the entire statutory scheme.
This article analyzes the Rehnquist Court's use of strict statutory
construction. It will argue that strict statutory construction can be justified
under public choice and agency theories of statutory interpretation, and that
strict construction promotes the implementation of bankruptcy policy. Strict
statutory construction, moreover, is beneficial because it produces reliability
and predictability, which is essential to our dynamic economy. The use of strict
statutory construction precludes a court from relying on legislative history to
manufacture the result that the court thinks is the best solution to the problem.
Another justification for strict statutory construction is that it prevents
bankruptcy judges from using their equitable powers to create entitlements
that are not authorized by the Code. There are, however, detriments to using
strict statutory construction. It can inhibit the development of bankruptcy law,
and it is also unproductive when public policy issues are involved. Indeed, it
can seriously inhibit the development of bankruptcy policy. After examining
the benefits and detriments of strict statutory construction, this article
concludes that bankruptcy courts should use it only when deciding
debtor-creditor issues.
The argument of this article proceeds in four stages. Part II examines strict
statutory interpretation, the Rehnquist Court's mode of statutory
interpretation, and the evolution of the plain meaning rule and holistic
statutory interpretation. Part III examines the rationales supporting strict
statutory interpretation, public choice theory, separation of powers theory, and
the principle of legislative supremacy. This section also argues that strict
statutory construction can serve the goals of predictability and reliability in the
interpretation of bankruptcy statutes. Part W examines the adverse effects of
strict statutory construction, in particular, whether it hinders the development
of the law by unduly constraining a court's discretion. Finally, Part V proposes
how courts should use strict statutory construction.
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Strict Statutory Construction Has Become the Significant Mode of Statutory
Construction in the Rehnquist Court
Although equitable principles play a major role in bankruptcy
jurisprudence, the Rehnquist Court has embraced the concept of strict statutory
construction. 9 The Rehnquist Court has employed two methods of strict
9E.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992) (plain meaning rule); Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992) (plain meaning rule); Union Bank v. Wolas,
502 U.S. 151 (1991) (strict statutory interpretation); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991)
19941
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statutory construction in its bankruptcy decisions. First, under the plain
meaning method, the Court will usually rely upon the text of the statute to
render its determination. 10 Second, under its holistic approach, the Court will
analyze the structure of the Code and then reach a determination that it thinks
is consistent with the text of a particular section and entire structure of the
Code.11 Both methods of statutory construction rely upon the express language
of the Code to analyze bankruptcy questions. The legislative history of a statute
is not considered,12 and equity is not allowed to override an express provision
of the Code.13
B. The Rehnquist Court, Plain Meaning and the Code
The Court has resorted to plain meaning interpretation to resolve various
issues involving the Code. 14 In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,15 the
debtor filed for Chapter 11, and the petitioner filed a proof of claim for unpaid
withholding and social security taxes, penalties, and postpetition interest. Its
claim was secured through a perfected tax lien, the petitioner contended that
it was entitled to postpetition interest under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) 16 because it was
oversecured. The respondent contended that the petitioner was not entitled to
postpetition interest because under the Bankruptcy Act only consensual
oversecured creditors were entitled to receive postpetition interest. Further, the
respondent argued that the text of section 506(b), reflected that the statute was
solely intended to apply consensual secured creditors because section 506(b)
(plain meaning interpretation); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (1990) (plain meaning interpretation); United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (holistic statutory interpretation).
10 See Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246; Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157,160-61 (1991); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
1 1See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83, 85 (1991); United Say. Ass'n of
Texas v. Timbers on Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
12 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-42.
13Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197,206-07 (1988); In re Rashid, 97
B.R. 610,615 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re Wiggs, 87 B.R. 57,59 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1988).
14 E.g., Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246 (1992); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S.
Ct. 1146,1149-50 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 530 (1991); Toibb, 501 U.S.
at 160-61 (1991); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-42.
15489 U.S. 235 (1989).
16 Section 506(b) states:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,
is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided for under agreement under which such claim
arose.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
[Vol. 42:435
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permitted a creditor to recover reasonable fees and costs as provided under the
agreement between the creditor and debtor. The issue was whether under
section 506(b) a nonconsensual1 7 oversecured creditor was entitled to
postpetition interest, and the Court held that it was entitled to postpetition
interest.18
Justice Harry Blackmun ruled that the answer to the question should be
resolved by examining the language and enforcing the terms of the statute.19
The express language of section 506(b) permitted a nonconsensual oversecured
creditor to receive postpetition interest.20 The granting of postpetition interest
to a nonconsensual oversecured creditor was also mandated by the
grammatical structure of section 506(b). 21 The language and punctuation of
section 506(b) reflect that Congress did not intend to differentiate between
consensual and nonconsensual secured creditors in the granting of postpetition
interest to an oversecured creditor.22 Further, allowing a nonconsensual over-
17A nonconsensual secured creditor is an entity that has obtained a lien on either
personal or real property through judicial process, such as a judgment creditor, or an
entity that has obtained a lien pursuant to a statute, such as a mechanic's lien. A
consensual secured creditor is someone that has obtained a lien on a debtor's property
pursuant to an agreement. For example, an entity that has acquired an Article Nine
security interest in personal property is a consensual secured creditor. Another example
of a consensual secured creditor is an entity that obtained a mortgage on real property.
18 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249.
19 The Court stated:
The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of § 506(b) begins
where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute
itself. In this case it is also where the inquiry should end, for where,
as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms.' The language before us expresses
Congress' intent-that postpetition interest be available-with sufficient
precision so that reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice
is hardly necessary.
Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
20The Court stated:
The relevant phrase in § 506(b) is: '[t]here shall be allowed to the holder
of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.'
'Such claim' refers to an oversecured claim. The natural reading of the
phrase entitles the holder of an oversecured claim to postpetition interest
and, in addition, gives one having a secured claim created pursuant to
an agreement the right to reasonable fees, costs, and charges provided for
in that agreement. Recovery of postpetition interest is unqualified.
Id.
2 1 d. at 241-43.
221d.
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secured creditor postpetition interest did not contravene any important state
or federal interest.23
Similarly, in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,24 where the debtors filed for
Chapter 13, the respondent had a deed of trust on the debtors' principal
residence and the respondent filed a proof of claim for principal, interest, and
fees owed on a note amounting to a total of $71,335. The debtors' Chapter 13
plan valued their residence at $23,500, and the debtors proposed to make
payments up to the value of the residence, $23,500. The debtors, relying on 11
U.S.C. § 506(a), 25 proposed to bifurcate the respondent's claim into secured and
unsecured portions and to treat the remainder of the claim as unsecured. Under
the plan, unsecured creditors would receive nothing. The respondent objected
to its treatment under the Chapter 13 plan on the ground that, under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2), 26 the debtors could not bifurcate the claim of an undersecured
residential mortgagee. The respondents prevailed in the bankruptcy court and
district court and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether section
1322(b)(2) prohibited a Chapter 13 debtor from bifurcating the claim of a
residential mortgagee in a Chapter 13 plan.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, 27 held under section
1322(b)(2), that an undersecured mortgagee's claim could not be bifurcated into
23 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 243. The Court will deviate from the text of a bankruptcy statute
if there is a significant federal or state interest, such as environmental protection,
involved in the case. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
24113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
25 The pertinent part of § 506(a) states:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553
of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the
amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so
subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
26 Section 1322(b)(2) states:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-...
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave un-
affected the rights of holders of any class of claims; ...
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
27 Since his arrival on the Court, Justice Thomas has been influential in the
bankruptcy area. Justice Thomas has written three opinions, and in each decision he has
employed strict statutory construction. See Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187 (1993);
Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992).
[Vol. 42:435
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/9
STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
secured and unsecured segments. 28 Under section 1322(b)(2), a Chapter 13
debtor is prohibited from modifying the rights of a creditor who has a mortgage
on the debtor's principal residence. 29 The term "rights" is not defined by the
Code, but rather, is defined by state law.30 The respondent's rights are
contained in the mortgage instrument, and they include the rights to monthly
principal payments, the right to an adjustable rate of interest, the right to retain
the lien until the loan is paid, the right of acceleration, and the right to
foreclose.31 All of the preceding rights are protected from modification under
section 1322(b)(2).32 Congress elected to treat residential mortgagees
differently than other secured creditors in Chapter 13 cases, and that is why it
made an exception for residential mortgagees in section 1322(b)(2). 33 The Court
refused to permit bifurcating because it would modify a residential
mortgagee's claim.34 The petitioners desired result was contrary to section
1322(b)(2), which prohibits the modification of a claim of a secured creditor
who has a lien on the debtor's primary residence.35
The preceding discussion reflects the Rehnquist Court's tendency to base its
decision upon the text of the Code. The Court will meticulously dissect the
words used in the text of a statute to determine the import of a statute. The
Court will employ the ordinary meaning of a word, and will not attribute any
special meaning to a word. In addition, as exemplified by United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises,36 the Court will analyze the grammatical structure of a statute
to determine the meaning of the provision. The Rehnquist Court will attempt
to interpret a statute in a manner that is consistent with the ordinary meaning
of the words used in the statute, and a manner that is consistent with the
grammatical structure of the text.
28 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2106.
29 d. at 2109.
30Id. at 2110.
3 1 d.
3 2 Id.
33 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
34 The Court stated:
Petitioners propose to reduce the outstanding mortgage principal to the
fair market value of the collateral, and, at the same time, they insist that
they can do so without modifying the bank's rights 'as to interest rates,
payment amounts, and [other] contract terms.' That appears to be
impossible. The bank's contractual rights are contained in a unitary note
that applies at once to the bank's overall claim, including both the secured
and unsecured components. Petitioners cannot modify the payment and
interest terms for the unsecured component, as they propose to do, with-
out also modifying the terms of the secured component.
Id. (citation omitted).
35 Id.
36489 U.S. 235 (1989).
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Under the Rehnquist Court, the legislative history of a statute is irrelevant,
and therefore, legislative history has played a minimal role in the Rehnquist
Court's bankruptcy decisions. Under the plain meaning rule, the Rehnquist
Court has been averse to examining the legislative history of the statute because
it is thought that Congress has made its intent clear through the use of the
words in the particular statute. Thus, there is no need to refer to legislative
history in order to determine congressional intent.
The Rehnquist Court is reluctant to employ policy arguments that would
contradict the express language of a statute. The plain meaning method does
not permit a court to entertain equitable arguments that would have the effect
of nullifying the clear language of the statute. The Rehnquist Court will deviate
from the text of a statute only when there is a compelling federal or other
societal interest which justifies deviating from the plain language of a statute.37
C. Holistic Statutory Construction
Another method of strict construction that the Rehnquist Court has used is
holistic statutory construction. When the Court has been unable to resolve a
bankruptcy issue by analyzing a particular statute, it has examined the
structure of the Code to resolve the specific issue.38 The Court reviews sections
of the Code that are relevant to the disposition of the issue to develop a holding
that is harmonious with the express provisions of the Code.
The Court used this approach in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.39 There an undersecured creditor moved for
relief from the automatic stay4O pursuant to section 362(d)(1). 41 The
37United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242-44 (1989). For example, in
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,507 (1986),
the Supreme Court deviated from the express language of 11 U.S.C. § 554, and it
prohibited a trustee from abandoning a toxic waste site. Section 554 did not contain any
express limitations on the trustee's abandonment power. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504. The
Court, nevertheless, ruled that environmental compelling state and local interests
restricted a trustee's power to abandon a toxic waste site. Id. at 507.
38 See, e.g., Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); United Sav. Ass'n of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
39484 U.S. 365 (1988).
4OSection 362(a) provides that when a bankruptcy petition is filed that the automatic
stay goes into effect. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988). Section 362(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under § 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under
§ 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of -
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action
or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been com-
menced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title;
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undersecured creditor contended that under section 362(d)(1), the phrase
"interest in property" includes the secured party's right to foreclose on its
collateral and apply it in payment of its debt.42 If a secured party is precluded
from foreclosing, then it is not adequately protected unless the secured party
is reimbursed for the use of the proceeds while the automatic stay is in effect.43
The bankruptcy court conditioned the continuance of the automatic stay on
monthly payments by the respondent at the market rate of 12% per annum, on
the estimated amount realizable on foreclosure, commencing six months after
the commencement of the bankruptcy case, to reflect the normal delay in
foreclosure.44 Although the district court affirmed, en banc the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.45 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether an undersecured creditor was entitled to compensation
under section 362(d)(1) for the delay caused by the automatic stay in foreclosing
on its collateral.46
(2) the enforcement against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
4 1Section 362(d)(1) states:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such
stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest;...
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988).
42 Timbers of Inwood, 484 U.S. at 370-71.
431d.
44 d. at 369.
4 51d.
46 Id.
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For a unanimous Court, Justice Antonin Scalia held that an undersecured
creditor was not entitled to postpetition interest.47 The Court based its decision
on its interpretation of different Code Sections because no particular Code
provision addressed the issue. Although section 362(d)(1) could be read to
authorize the payment of postpetition interest to undersecured creditors, 48 it
was necessary to refer to other provisions of the Code to determine whether
undersecured creditors were entitled to lost opportunity costs.49 Allowing an
undersecured creditor to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs
would have been contradictory to 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), which permits only
oversecured creditors postpetition interest.50 The Court also rejected the
petitioner's argument that section 506(b) was an alternative method for
granting postpetition interest.51 The granting of postpetition petition interest
would have been contrary to the policy underlying section 506(b). 52 Granting
47484 U.S. at 382.
48 The phrase "interest in property" was undefined and nebulous. Id. at 371.
Therefore, a plausible interpretation of "interest in property" could require the payment
of postpetition interest to an undersecured creditor. Id. at 370-71.
4 9 Justice Scalia wrote:
Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor. A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of
the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permis-
sible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law. That is the case here. Section 362(d)(1) is only one of a
series of provisions in the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the rights of
secured creditors. The language in those other provisions, and the sub-
stantive dispositions that they effect, persuade us that the 'interest in
property' protected by § 362(d)(1) does not include a secured party's right
to immediate foreclosure.
Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
5 0The Court declared:
Since this provision [506(b)] permits postpetition interest to be paid only
out of the 'security cushion,' the undersecured creditor, who has no such
cushion, falls within the general rule disallowing postpetition interest. If
the Code had meant to give the undersecured creditor, who is thus denied
interest on his claim, interest on the value of his collateral, surely this is
where that disposition would have been set forth, and not obscured with-
in the 'adequate protection' provision of § 362(d)(1). Instead of the intricate
phraseology set forth above, § 506(b) would simply have said that the
secured creditor is entitled to interest 'on his allowed claim, or on the value
of the property securing his allowed claim, whichever is lesser.' Petitioner's
interpretation of § 362(d)(1) must be regarded as contradicting the carefully
drawn disposition of § 506(b).
Id. at 372-73 (citation omitted).
51 d. at 373.
52The Court stated:
This theory of duplicate protection for oversecured creditors is implausible
even in the abstract, but even more so in light of the historical principles of
bankruptcy law. Section 506(b)'s denial of postpetition interest to under-
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an undersecured creditor lost opportunity costs would have been contrary to
11 U.S.C. § 552 because such a grant would have effectively given an
undersecured creditor a security interest in property acquired after the
commencement of the case.53 Finally, the petitioner's interpretation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1) would have made nonsense of section 362(d)(2). 54 The petitioner
alleged that its inability to take immediate possession of its collateral was cause
for granting the undersecured creditor lost opportunity costs. 55 But, the
petitioner's argument would have made section 362(d)(2) a nullity.56
Timbers is significant because it introduced a new method of statutory
construction. As with the plain meaning rule, the focus under holistic statutory
construction is on the words enacted by Congress as reflected by the entire
statutory scheme. As Timbers demonstrates, when a particular provision fails
to address an issue the Court will examine the entire statutory scheme in order
secured creditors merely codified pre-Code bankruptcy law, in which that
denial was part of the conscious allocation of reorganization benefits and
loses between undersecured and unsecured creditors. 'To allow a secured
creditor interest where his security was worth less than the value of his
debt was thought to be inequitable to unsecured creditors.'
Timbers of Inwood, 484 U.S. at 365.
53 Justice Scalia wrote:
Section 552(b) therefore makes possession of a perfected security
interest in postpetition rents or profits from collateral a condition of
having them applied to satisfying the claim of the secured creditor
ahead of the claims of unsecured creditors. Under petitioner's interpre-
tation, however, the undersecured creditor who lacks such a perfected
security interest in effect achieves the same result by demanding the
'use value' of his collateral under § 362. It is true that § 506(b) gives the
oversecured creditor, despite lack of compliance with the conditions
of § 552, a similar priority over unsecured creditors; but that does not
compromise the principle of § 552, since the interest payments come
only out of the 'cushion' in which the oversecured creditor does have
a perfected security interest.
Id. at 374.
54 1d. at 374-75.
55Id.
56 The Court wrote:
By applying the 'adequate protection of an interest in property' provision
of § 362(d)(1) to the alleged 'interest' in the earning power of the collateral,
petitioner creates the strange consequence that § 362 entitles the secured
creditor to relief from the stay (1) if he is undersecured (and thus not
eligible for interest under § 506(b)), or (2) if he is undersecured and his
collateral 'is not necessary to an effective reorganization.' This renders
§ 362(d)(2) a practical nullity and a theoretical absurdity. If § 362(d)(1) is
interpreted in this fashion, an undersecured creditor would seek relief
under § 362(d)(2) only if his collateral was not depreciating (or it was
being compensated for depreciation) and he was receiving market rate
interest on his collateral, but nonetheless wanted to foreclose.
Id. at 375.
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to resolve the issue pending before it. Again, the Court will focus on the
legislation that Congress has enacted to reach its determination. The Court will
attempt to reach a decision that harmonizes the Code section at issue with the
entire statutory scheme. The Rehnquist Court avoids resorting to the legislative
history of the particular enactment in order to reach its decision. Indeed, as
with the plain meaning method, the holistic approach minimizes concepts such
as equity and public policy which play only minor, if any, roles in interpreting
the Code.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Public Choice Theory
Strict statutory construction of the Code can be explained under the public
choice theory of statutory interpretation. Public choice theory posits that
legislation is not enacted to further the public good, but rather, to further the
ends of a particular interest group.57 Under public choice theory, legislators are
primarily concerned with getting reelected. 58 Interest groups that make
significant campaign contributions wield a disproportionate amount of power
in the legislature, and it is these groups that are able to have legislation passed
that furthers their economic interests.59
Public choice theory promotes strict statutory construction as a means of
enforcing legislative contracts between the legislature and the interest group
who sought the enactment of specific legislation.60 The terms of the legislative
57Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L. J. 31, 35 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 446-47 (1989).
58 Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITr. L.
REV. 691, 705 (1987).
59William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 2.87 (1988); Landes & Posner, supra
note 6, at 877. Professor Macey has stated:
The economic theory of legislation predicts that laws are likely to benefit
the few at the expense of the many, because no one has an incentive to
enact laws that benefit the people in general. This is the classic 'free-rider'
problem that inevitably plagues public interest legislation in a represen-
tative democracy. Because the benefits of such legislation are spread
among everyone in the population, individual members of the public
lack sufficient incentives to promote public interest laws since all the costs
of such promotion must be absorbed by the promoters themselves. Hence,
the laws that are enacted will tend to benefit whichever small, cohesive
special interest groups lobby most effectively.
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 231-32 (1986).
6 OEskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 325; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L. J. 319,320 (1989).
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contract are the text of the statute.61 Public choice theory posits that a judge
should ignore the legislative history of the statute because it is impossible to
reconstruct legislative intent. Instead, the courts should focus on the words
employed in the statute because the words of the statute embody the deal
struck between the interest groups and the legislature. A court should not
deviate from the terms of a statute to determine a case in a manner which the
judge thinks that the legislature would have acted because the court will only
be engaging in mere speculation.62
The judiciary performs a vital role in public choice theory through the
employment of strict statutory construction. It is the independent judiciary that
will enforce the terms of the legislative bargain because it is the judiciary that
will interpret the statute.63 An independent judiciary with lifetime tenure will
be free from political pressure from the current legislature, and thus, it will be
able to enforce original legislative intent as set forth by the words of the
statute.64 Unless there is some constitutional infirmity, the courts should
uphold the legislation and not substitute their views for those of Congress.65
Public choice theory is useful because one can view the Code as a series of
legislative deals between different interest groups and the Congress. For
example, the 1984 amendments to the Code reflect public choice theory in
operation. The consumer credit industry was displeased with the manner in
which debtors could readily liquidate their consumer debt in Chapter 7.
Debtors would amass significant consumer debt and discharge the debt in
Chapter 7, while simultaneously reaffirming their residential mortgage
obligations and keeping their homes. Consequently, the consumer credit
61Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597,1603 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 533, 547 (1983).
62 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 881 (1987).
631t is only an independent judiciary that will be free from political influence, and
thus, at liberty to interpret a statute in accordance with original legislative
understanding of the statute, which is usually the text of the statute. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 6, at 879.
64Id.
65 Professor Macey has written:
On the other hand, when an interest group bargain is explicit, courts
should uphold the bargain. It is well settled that it is illegitimate for
judges to impose their own values in place of those of the legislature,
because such substitution thwarts Congress' constitutional authority to
make law. The legislature, and not the judiciary, is the forum through
which societal preference are aggregated. Statutory decisions are legiti-
mate only when judges enforce the law as enacted by the legislature.
This general maxim that judges must respect the legislature's will is
subject only to the judicial power to review statutes for constitutional
infirmity.
Macey, supra note 59, at 239.
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industry obtained the enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 66 Section 707(b) makes
it more difficult for affluent debtors to file for Chapter 7 and discharge their
consumer debt because a bankruptcy court is authorized to dismiss a case if
granting relief would constitute a substantial abuse.
Commercial real estate interests were troubled with the manner in which
some real estate would remain vacant during the pendency of a bankruptcy
case. The commercial real estate lobby was able to obtain the enactment of 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(10). 67 Pursuant to section 362(b)(10), a lessor of nonresidential
real property can take action to obtain possession of the property after the
expiration of the stated term of the lease before or after the commencement of
a bankruptcy case. The commercial real estate interests also secured the passage
of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3), 68 which mandates that a trustee perform all obligations
of the lease until the lease is either accepted or rejected by the bankruptcy estate.
The commercial real estate lobby also obtained the passage of 11 U.S.C. §
365(d)(4). 69 Under section 365(d)(4), within the sixty day period after the entry
66 Section 707(b) states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of
this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
67 Section 362(b)(10) states:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or
of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3), does not operate as a stay-...
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of an act by a lessor to the debtor
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the
expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or
during a case under this title to obtain possession of such property; ...
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10) (1988).
68 The pertinent part of § 365(d)(3) states:
The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except
those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for
relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until
such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of
this title.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (1988).
69 Section 365(d)(4) states:
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within
60 days after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time
as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is
deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresi-
dential real property to the lessor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988).
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of the relief order a debtor or trustee must either make a motion or obtain an
order permitting it to assume or extending its time to assume a nonresidential
lease of real property or else the nonresidential lease will terminate by
operation of law. Finally, the commercial real estate lobby obtained the
enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2). 70 Under section 541(b)(2), a lease which
expired according to the stated term of the lease before the commencement of
the bankruptcy case does not become property of the estate, and a lease which
expires according to the stated term of the lease during the course of a
bankruptcy case ceases to become property of the estate. The real estate lobby
secured various amendments to the Code to protect its interest against
delinquent debtors. These amendments reflect how a particular industry can
obtain legislation to protect its interests.
Another example of special interest legislation is 11 U.S.C. § 1114.71 When
LTV Corporation filed for Chapter 11 it immediately stopped paying the
medical and welfare benefits of its retirees. 72 This caused an uproar by
organized labor, and Congress enacted section 1114 to regulate the treatment
of retirement benefits in a Chapter 11 case. 73 Section 1114 was intended to
prevent Chapter 11 debtors from unilaterally terminating the retirement
benefits of its former workers. Thus, section 1114 is another example of public
choice legislation.
The preceding discussion reflects how different interest groups were
instrumental in obtaining bankruptcy legislation that dealt with specific issues
that affected different interest groups. Strict statutory construction of
bankruptcy statutes insures not only that legislative contracts will be enforced,
but also that congressional intent will be effectuated. Public choice theory
provides an analytical framework for understanding that the Code is economic
legislation which regulates debtor-creditor relationships. When Congress
enacts bankruptcy legislation it is usually after receiving input from the interest
groups that will be affected by the legislation. Normally, Congress will enact
The purpose underlying Code § 365(d)(4) is to compel the debtor to take some
action within the sixty day period. If the debtor fails to take any action, then the lease is
deemed rejected by operation of law. BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK,
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 7.10[61 (3d ed. 1992).
70Section 541(b)(2) states:
(b) Property of the estate does not include- ...
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential
real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of
such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and
ceases to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease
of nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of
the stated term of such lease during the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2) (1988).
7111 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
722 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 911114.01 (L. King ed. 1994).
73S. REP. No. 119, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683.
1994]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy legislation after studying, debating and deliberating over a
particular issue, and the legislation that is enacted is a result between Congress
and the different interest groups. Strict statutory construction helps to enforce
the deal that was struck between the interest groups and Congress because
strict statutory construction requires a court to adhere to the text of the statute.
If a court were at liberty to deviate from the text of a bankruptcy statute, then
that would destroy the legislative deals and the compromises that underlie the
Code. Thus, public choice provides a rationale for strict statutory interpretation
because strict statutory construction is the mechanism for the enforcing
legislative deals.
B. Legislative Supremacy
The Constitution delegates the authority to enact laws to Congress.74
Congress is democratically elected, and therefore, is accountable to the
electorate. Under the agency theory of statutory interpretation, it is incumbent
upon the judiciary to interpret the text of the statute as enacted by Congress.75
If the judiciary departs from the text of the statute, it is legislating, thereby
violating the separation of powers doctrine. Judicial activism denigrates the
reputation of the judiciary because Article III judges have lifetime tenure and
are not accountable to the electorate. Further, if the electorate disagrees with
the enactment of particular legislation, then the electorate has the option of
voting the legislator out of office. However, the electorate does not have the
option of voting an Article III judge out of office. Even though bankruptcy
judges are Article I judges, they serve for a fourteen year term, and they are
relatively insulated from political pressure and are not accountable to the
voters.76 Therefore, judicial activism by bankruptcy judges is also thought to
be antidemocratic and contrary to the separation of powers doctrine.
The concept of legislative supremacy is important in the context of the Code.
Congress spent several years studying the various problems of the Bankruptcy
Act, and after several years of study it enacted a comprehensive Code. The
Code is a comprehensive statute which regulates insolvencies and
reorganizations; if courts freely deviate from the text of the Code, then the
policies underlying particular statutes and the Code would be undermined.
Therefore, in order for legislative supremacy to work the judiciary must strictly
interpret statutes.
Legislative supremacy works when Congress has enacted a precise statute.
A clearly worded statute transmits a clear message to the judiciary and society
that a particular statute will govern a particular situation. When a statute is
74U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 1.
75Under the agency theory of statutory interpretation, it is incumbent upon thejudiciary to follow the text of a statute and not deviate from the text of the statute. When
the judiciary faithfully adheres to the text of the statute it fulfills its role under the
Constitution. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 415.
7628 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1988).
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clear, a court should act as an agent of Congress and enforce the statute
according to the plain meaning of the statute.77 It is through the enforcement
of a clearly written statute that the judiciary upholds the concept of legislative
supremacy.
For example, in Patterson v. Shumate,78 the debtor was a participant in an
ERISA pension plan, and, as required by law, the plan contained an
anti-alienation provision. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), 79 the debtor
attempted to exclude from his bankruptcy estate his interest in the plan. The
trustee contended that the debtor's interest in the plan was part of his
bankruptcy estate. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether under
section 541(c)(2) an ERISA pension plan which contains an anti-alienation
provision could be excluded from a bankruptcy estate. The Court held that
under section 541(c)(2) ERISA pension plans could be excluded from a
bankruptcy estate.80 The Supreme Court examined the express language of
section 541(c)(2), and it reached the conclusion that nonbankruptcy law
includes ERISA.81 The Court also reasoned that if Congress had intended to
limit the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" only to state law it would have
used the phrase "state law"; however, Congress did not restrict section 541(c)(2)
to only state law.82 Plainly read, section 541(c)(2) encompassed ERISA plans. 83
The Court was satisfied that the particular plan contained an anti-alienation
provision and met the test contained in section 541(c)(2). 84
The preceding discussion supports this author's position that, when
Congress has tailored a specific statute to govern a particular situation, a court
should enforce the terms of the statute. The legislature and judiciary would
77 Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 CEO. L. J. 281,
287(1989).
78112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
79Section 541(c)(2) states:
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforce-
able in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
8 0patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250.
8 1The Court stated:
The natural reading of the provision entitles a debtor to exclude from
property of the estate any interest in a plan or trust that contains a transfer
restriction enforceable under any relevant nonbankruptcy law. Nothing in
§ 541 suggests that the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' refers, as
petitioner contends, exclusively to state law. The text contains no limita-
tion on 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' relating to the source of the law.
Id. at 2246.
82Id.
83 d. at 2247.
84 d. at 2247-48.
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then be performing their roles as set forth in the Constitution. The judiciary in
making their decisions would not be imposing its political preferences or
engaging in equity, but rather, enforcing the clear terms of the statute.85
C. The Enforcement of Bankruptcy Policy
When Congress has contemplated, debated, and enacted legislation
concerning a particular issue, strict statutory construction of a particular statute
can lead to the implementation of bankruptcy policy. When Congress enacted
the Code it revised the eligibility requirements for debtors, and it liberalized
the requirements for filing for Chapter 11.86 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(d),
Congress provided that corporations, partnerships, and individuals could
reorganize under section 109(d). 87 Congress intended to provide open access
to Chapter 11 to avoid unnecessary liquidations, and therefore, one does not
have to be insolvent to file for Chapter 11.
In Toibb v. Radloff,88 for example, the Court used strict statutory construction
to enforce the policies underlying section 109(d). There, the petitioner was a
former staff attorney with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission who
was employed as a consultant with Independence Electric Corporation
(hereinafter IEC). The petitioner also owned 24% of IEC's stock. After IEC
terminated the petitioner's employment, he was unable to obtain work.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed for Chapter 7. During the Chapter 7 case, IEC
offered to purchase the petitioner's shares for $25,000. When the petitioner
became aware of the offer, he moved to convert his case to Chapter 11. The
bankruptcy court dismissed the petitioner's Chapter 11 case because the debtor
was not engaged in an ongoing business. The district court and Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss the petitioner's
case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the issue before the Court was
whether an individual who was not engaged in an ongoing business was
eligible for Chapter 11.
The Supreme Court held that an individual who is not engaged in business
is eligible for Chapter 11.89 The Court relied upon the express language of
85 The agency theory of statutory interpretation is a vital element of public choice
theory. Public choice theory only operates if the judiciary is willing to enforce the text
of the statute. If the judiciary is willing to depart from the text of the statute, then the
legislative contractwillnotbe enforced and the interest group will not receive the benefit
of its bargain.
86 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
87Section 109(d) states:
Only a person that may be a debtor under Chapter 7 of this title, except
a stockbroker or a commodity broker, and a railroad may be a debtor
under Chapter 11 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1988).
88111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
891d. at 2202.
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section 109 to reach its holding.90 Section 109(d) does not preclude an
individual from filing for Chapter 11.91 Significantly, the Code did not contain
an ongoing business requirement for Chapter 11.92 If Congress had intended
to restrict the use of Chapter 11 by individuals, it would have expressly placed
a restriction in section 109.93 Further, the legislative history was insufficient to
contradict the express language of section 109(d).94
In Toibb the strict construction of section 109(d) implements the bankruptcy
policy of open access to Chapter 11 relief. Congress made a conscious decision
to permit open access to Chapter 11 relief because the text of section 109(d)
expressed this intention because it contains no express prohibition which
prevents an individual without an ongoing business from filing for Chapter 11.
The Court implemented congressional policy by strictly construing section
109(d) and not imposing any implied requirements. Strict statutory
construction is an important tool in implementing congressional policy
because the text of a carefully drafted statute will reflect the policy that the
statute is attempting to implement and the goals that the statute is attempting
to effectuate. Therefore, when Congress has studied, debated and enacted
specific bankruptcy legislation concerning a particular issue, strict statutory
construction leads to the implementation of bankruptcy policy.
D. Reliance on Legislative History Can Be Dubious
A major feature of strict statutory construction is that it deemphasizes and
distrusts legislative history. Legislative history is thought to be unreliable as a
true gauge of what Congress intended because usually Congressmen and
Senators do not review committee reports before they enact legislation.
Furthermore, the legislators do not play a major role in drafting the committee
reports, but it is the staffers who are normally responsible for writing the report.
The only document that the legislators approve is the particular statute, and
this is the only document that has the imprimatur of the entire legislative body.
Legislative history can be manipulated to produce a desired outcome;
therefore, relying upon legislative history to interpret a statute can lead to the
misinterpretation of a statute. Professors Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey
have made the following remarks concerning the use of legislative history to
interpret statutes:
901d. at 2199.
92Id.
93 Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199.
94 d. at 2200. The House Report concerning the Code stated that if an individual was
ineligible for Chapter 13, then the only available chapter for relief was Chapter 7. Id. The
Senate Report stated that although primarily designed for business, individuals were
also eligible for Chapter 11 relief. Id. Therefore, the Court was reluctant to rely on the
legislative history to disregard the express provisions of the Code. Id.
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Imagine a country where laws are usually the unpredictable results of
shifting coalitions and arbitrary agendas. Legislative committees
produce official reports that purport to explain those laws, but are
actually concocted by staff members and lobbyists to deceive courts
about the meaning of the statutes. After statutes are passed, legislators
contrive to smuggle their personal interpretations of the laws into later
committee reports and debates dealing with other matters. Courts
foolishly give credence to this deceptive evidence of a legislative intent
that itself is little more than a legal fiction; moreover, the courts
sometimes even elevate counterfeit legislative history above the duly
enacted language of the law itself.95
A case that reflects how a court can manipulate legislative history to reach a
desired outcome is Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of
America.96 The debtor was one of the largest steel manufacturers in the United
States. 97 The debtor and the United Steelworkers of America (hereinafter
Union) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA),
and approximately 8,500 employees were subject to the CBA. Beginning in the
early 1980's, the debtor requested and received various concessions from the
Union.98 In the middle of January 1985, the Union was asked to make more
concessions; however, the Union refused to acquiesce to the debtor's
requests. 99 The Union wanted the debtor's lenders to also make concessions.
Thereafter, the debtor made another proposal which sought concessions from
the Union, the lenders, and the debtor's shareholders. 100 The Union was
dissatisfied with this proposal because it thought it was imprudent for the
debtor to pledge all of its assets to secure all of its old debt.101 On April 16,1985,
the debtor filed for Chapter 11, and on May 31, 1985, the debtor filed a motion
to modify the CBA.102 The application sought various modifications to the CBA
including an hourly wage reduction from $21.40 to $15.20 for a five year
period.103 Further, there was no snap-back provision concerning the hourly
wage if the debtor's performance turned out to be better than its financial
9 5 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 423 (1988).
96791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
971d. at 1076.
981d. at 1076-77.
991d. at 1077.
lOOId.
101Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1077.
102 Id. at 1077-78.
103 Id. at 1078.
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projections.104 The bankruptcy court permitted the modification of the CBA
because the modifications were necessary to the debtor's reorganization. 105
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court.106 The Union appealed the
decision regarding the modification of the CBA to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. 107
The principal issue on appeal before the Third Circuit was what was the
meaning of the term "necessary modification" as used in 11 U.S.C. §
1113(b)(1)(A). 108 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a necessary
modification is a modification that is essential to the debtor's short term
survival.109 The court began its analysis by stating that the enactment of section
1113 was an attempt to legislatively overrule the Bildisco decision.110 The Third
Circuit focused on the different bills that were introduced to govern the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.Ill The court also noted that the
concept of "necessary modification" is derived from legislation proposed by
Senator Robert Packwood, and that different legislators thought that section
1113 resembled the Packwood Amendment. 112 Senator Packwood thought
that the term "necessary modification" only permitted modifications that were
104Id.
105id.
106 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1076.
107 d.
108Section 1113(b)(1) states:
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an applica-
tion seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor
in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include
a debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees
covered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of such proposal, which provides
for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protec-
tions that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and
assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably....
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
109 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1088-89.
110 d. at 1081-82. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the Court held that
a collectivebargaining agreementwas an executory contract that could be rejected under
§ 365(a). The Supreme Court, in addition, held that the balancing of the equities test was
the correct test for determining whether a collective bargaining agreement should be
rejected. Id. Finally, the Court ruled that a debtor did not commit an unfair labor practice
when it unilaterally modified a collective bargaining agreement prior to rejecting the
agreement. Id.
111Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1083-84.
112Id. at 1087-88.
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necessary to a successful reorganization."13 The court, based on the statements
of the various legislators, concluded that the term "necessary modification" is
intended to mean a modification that was essential to the company's financial
reorganization. 114 The Third Circuit also concluded that the proposed
modifications had to be essential to the debtor's short term survival.115
The Third Circuit also ruled that the necessity requirement has to be
interpreted along with the requirement that all parties be treated "fairly and
equitably."11 6 The court held the debtor's proposal did not contain necessary
modifications because it lacked a snap-back provision.117 The Third Circuit also
held that the bankruptcy court erred because it applied an incorrect standard
in granting the motion to modify the CAB.11 8 The bankruptcy court focused
on the debtor's long-term rehabilitation, rather than on the debtor's immediate
1 13 d. at 1088.
1 14 The Third Circuit stated:
The 'necessary' standard cannot be satisfied by a mere showing that it
would be desirable for the trustee to reject a prevailing labor contract
so that the debtor can lower its costs. Such an indulgent standard
would inadequately differentiate between labor contracts, which Congress
sought to protect, and other commercial contracts, which the trustee
can disavow at will. The congressional consensus that the 'necessary'
language was substantially the same as the phrasing in Senator
Packwood's amendment, which looked to the 'minimum modifications
... that would permit the reorganization,' requires that 'necessity' be
construed strictly to signify only modifications that the trustee is con-
strained to accept because they are directly related to the Company's
financial condition and its reorganization. We reject the hypertechnical
argument that 'necessary' and 'essential' have different meanings because
they are in different subsections. The words are synonymous.
791 F.2d at 1088.
115The court stated:
It is significant that the Thurmond amendment, which the conferees did
not accept, and Bildisco, which they clearly sought to modify, seemed
directed to the successful rehabilitation of the debtor, which suggests
focus on the long-term economic health of the debtor. While we do not
suggest that the general long-term viability of the Company is not a
goal of the debtor's reorganization, it appears from the legislators'
remarks that they placed the emphasis in determining whether and
what modifications should be made to a negotiated collective bargain-
ing agreement on the somewhat shorter term goal of preventing the
debtor's liquidation, the mirror image of what is 'necessary to permit
the reorganization of the debtor.'
Id. at 1088-89.
1 161d. at 1089.
1 171d. at 1090.
1 181d.
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survival. 119 The debtor's failure to include a snap-back provision unfairly
discriminated against the Union.120
The weakness with the holding of the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel decision is
that it propels inconclusive legislative history to supersede the express
language of the statute, and it fails to read section 1113 in conjunction with other
Code sections. 121 The court manipulates indecisive legislative history not only
to rebut the clear text and structure of section 1113, but also to rebut related
provisions of the Code. First, the word 'necessary' is not synonymous with the
word 'essential'. The word 'essential' is used in section 1113(e) to permit interim
changes to a collective bargaining agreement if an interim change is essential
to the continuation of the debtor's business.122 However, section
1113(b)(1)(A)1 23 uses the word 'necessary' when the court is determining
whether the debtor should be permitted to permanently modify a collective
bargaining agreement.124 If Congress had intended to permit only essential
119 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1090.
1201d. at 1093.
121The problem in is set forth in the following statement:
When courts and agencies use legislative history to find a more specific
intent then the statute expresses, legislators have an incentive to 'manu-
facture' legislative history on points of interest to them. This manufactur-
ing can occur at any time, even long before a bill is introduced, in the
hearings or meetings between agency staff and members of Congress
preceding the bill drafting. Most manufacturing, however, seems to
occur after a bill has been introduced, by members of Congress who
would rather manufacture legislative history that expresses their intent
then try to amend the bill to express it. All it takes is one member of
Congress declaring on the floor his or her 'understanding' of what
some vague portion of the bill is 'intended to mean.' Normally, how-
ever, two members, one of whom is a sponsor of the bill, cooperate.
The second member asks the sponsor what the bill is intended to mean,
and the sponsor answers.
W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statu tory Interpretation Under
the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 397 (1992).
122Section 1113(e) states:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues
in effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or
in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice
and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes
in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a
collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall
be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implemen-
tation of such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection
moot.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1988).
12311 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
1241d.
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modifications to permit reorganization, then presumably it would have used
the word 'essential' instead of the word 'necessary'.
The Third Circuit's analysis is also flawed because it fails to take into
consideration the structure of section 1113. Section 1113(e) is solely concerned
with granting a debtor interim relief from a collective bargaining agreement.125
As such, pursuant to section 1113(e), a debtor can make interim changes in
collective bargaining agreements if the changes are "essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage
to the estate."126 The purpose of section 1113(e) is to enable the debtor to make
immediate changes to a collective bargaining agreement that are essential to
the debtor's short term survival. Accordingly, section 1113(e) focuses on
changes that are essential to the continuation of the debtor's business or
changes that are required to avoid irreparable harm. In contrast, 11 U.S.C. §
1113(b)(1)(A) provides for the permanent modifications of collective
bargaining agreements, and thus, the focus is on necessary modifications
which permit reorganization. The concept of a reorganization necessarily
entails a much longer time frame than the immediate future. If the time frames
were the same, then Congress would have used identical language in both
sections 1113(b)(1)(A) and 1113(e). Thus, the Third Circuit is incorrect to state
that under section 1113(b)(1)(A) only those modifications that are necessary to
the debtor's short term survival are permissible.
Finally, the Third Circuit's interpretation is contrary to other provisions of
the Code. Section 1129(a)(11) requires that all reorganization plans be
confirmed only if the particular reorganization plan is feasible.127 The
feasibility requirement concerns the long term stability of a debtor.128 The
feasibility requirement is intended to ensure that a debtor will not require
further bankruptcy relief after the confirmation of the case.129 The Third Circuit
fails to read section 1113(b)(1)(A) in conjunction with section 1129(a)(11). The
phrase "necessary to permit reorganization" is connected to the feasibility
requirement because the purpose of modifying a collective bargaining
agreement is to permit the debtor to develop a feasible reorganization plan.
Thus, the Third Circuit's unwillingness to examine the structure of the entire
Code and develop an interpretation of section 1113, which is harmonious with
the entire Code, is another defect of its opinion in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel.
125Charlene R. Ehrenwerth & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The New Bankruptcy Procedures
For Rejection of Collective-Bargaining Agreements: Is The Pendulum Swinging Back?, 23 DUQ.
L. REV. 939, 968-69 (1985); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983, 1006 (1985).
12611 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1988).
12711 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
1285 COLLIER ON BANKRurTCY 1129.02[111 (L. King 15th ed. 1994); PATRICK A. MURPHY,
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY§ 17-11 (2d ed. 1989).
12 9WENTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 69, 1 8.23[2]; RICHARD F. BROUDE,
REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 12.14 (1991).
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The Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel decision demonstrates that the use of
legislative history can be deceptive and misleading. Reliance on legislative
history can enable a court to craft an opinion reaching the conclusion that it
desires because it can rely on the statements of individual legislators that are
favorable to the position that the court desires to advance. The weakness of
legislative history is readily seen when the legislative history expressly
contradicts the legislation that was enacted. Under these circumstances,
reference to legislative history for support of the interpretation of a statute is
disingenuous because the court is laboring to attain a desired result. The
language of the particular statute and the entire Code provide the clearest
indication of what Congress intended because the legislators voted on the
particular provision. Although some legislators thought that they were
overruling the substantive requirements for the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements, the text they adopted embodied the substantive
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Bildisco. Thus, in
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, the plain meaning of section 1113 should have
prevailed because it was only the legislation that was enacted.
E. Predictability and Reliability
Strict statutory interpretation also provides debtors and creditors with
predictability in the enforcement of bankruptcy statutes. For example, a
majority of courts have strictly construed sections 544(a)(1) 130 and 544(a)(3), 131
and these courts have held that a trustee is not subject to equitable defenses
such as a constructive trust or equitable estoppel when he uses the strong arm
powers.132 Sections 544(a)(1) and 544(a)(3) are based on the policy of ostensible
13 0Section 544(a)(1) states:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee of any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and
with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which
a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;...
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
13 1Section 544(a)(3) states:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee of any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from
the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to
be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and
has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the
case, whether or not such purchaser exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1988).
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ownership. 133 In Belisle v. Plunkett1 34 a debtor formed five partnerships to raise
funds for the purchase of a shopping center lease in the Virgin Islands. The
debtor used partnership funds to purchase the lease; however, the debtor
recorded the lease in his own name. Thereafter, debtor and his wife filed
bankruptcy petitions. The issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether a
trustee may bring into the bankruptcy estate property that the debtor holds in
constructive trust for victims of fraud.
The Seventh Circuit held that under section 544(a)(3) the leasehold was
property of the estate. 135 Since section 544(a)(3) grants a trustee the status of a
bona fide purchaser,136 and a bona fide purchaser of the leasehold interest,
without notice of the earlier claim, would take ahead of a person who has not
recorded his interest. 13 7 It follows that, a trustee, acting as a bona fide
purchaser, is entitled to avoid the interests of the partners who had failed to
record their interests. 138
The court also rejected the argument that under section 541(d) the leasehold
was not part of the estate because the estate does not include property in which
a debtor holds bare legal title.139 Section 544(a)(3) permits a trustee to bring
into the estate certain property that ostensibly belongs to the estate.140 Under
132The majority position is that a trustee using § 544(a) is not subject to the affirmative
defense of a constructive trust. E.g., In re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.
1990); Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989); In re
Tleel, 876 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Anderson, 30 Bankr. 995 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); In
re Elin, 20 Bankr. 1012 (D.N.J. 1982), affd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1983); In
re Cascade Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Dlott, 43 Bankr. 789 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983); In re Great Plains Western Ranch Co., 38 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1984). The minority position is that property held pursuant to a constructive trust is
invulnerable to the application of § 544(a). E.g., In re Howard's Appliance Corp., 874
F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Quality Holstein Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Triple A Coal Co., 55 Bankr. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Earl Ruggenbuck Farms,
Inc., 51 Bankr. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
133 0ne court has written:
There seem to be at least two important reasons why the idea of ostensible
ownership bulks so large in bankruptcy law. First, it helps to police against
fraud on the part of debtors-fraud that may occur with or without the
collusion of creditors. Secondly, quite apart from any imputation of fraud,
it helps to permit the kind of reliance said to be essential to a dynamic
commercial economy.
In re Great Plains Western Ranch Co., 38 B.R. 899, 904 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
134877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989).
13 51d. at 516.
13 61d. at 513.
13 71d. at 514.
13 81d.
13 9Belisle, 877 F.2d at 514-15.
1401d.
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most recording statutes a purchaser in good faith of real property can obtain a
superior position to the rightful owner, if the rightful owner fails to record its
interest.141 Section 544(a)(3) grants a trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser
without notice which allows a trustee to prevail over an entity that has
neglected to observe the local recording statutes. 142 Under section 544(a)(3),
the trustee was able to avoid the interests of the partners.143
The court also rejected the argument that section 541(d)144 placed a
restriction on the trustee's strong arm powers.145 Section 541(d) does not place
a limitation on section 544(a)(3). 146 Section 541(d) is silent concerning whether
property obtained through Code provisions, other than section 541, can
become property of the estate.147 Therefore, section 541(d) did not preclude the
trustee from employing section 544(a)(3) to avoid the partners' interests in the
leasehold.148
The preceding discussion reflects that strict statutory construction of
unambiguous bankruptcy statutes is necessary to the operation of our
economy. Strict construction facilitates the operation of recording statutes and
the granting of credit because it produces reliability. Although the strict
enforcement of the recording statutes may have been unfair to the defrauded
14 1 d. at 515.
142 Id.
14 3The court remarked:
A bona fide purchaser from Plunkett would have taken ahead of the
partners under local law. They neglected to record the partnerships'
interest, though recording is easy.(The partners could, and in retrospect
should, have refused to invest funds except through an escrow agent,
who would have held the cash until good title had been recorded in the
partnerships' names.) One of Plunkett's creditors, extending $100,000
against a collateral assignment of the leasehold, actually obtained a
position superior to that of the partners. The trustee claimed the same
position for the estate (meaning the creditors collectively, including the
partners).
Id.
144 Section 541(d) states:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case,
only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured
by real property, or an interest in such mortgage, sold by the debtor but as
to which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing
of such mortgage or interest, becomes property of the estate under sub-
section (a)(1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal
title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such
property that the debtor does not hold.
11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988).
145Belisle, 877 F.2d at 515-16.
146Id.
14 71d.
14 8Id.
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partners, establishing an equitable exception would have weakened the
reliability of the recording statutes and would have invited secret liens and
fraud. Strict construction led to the enforcement of the policy of ostensible
ownership, which is intended to combat secret liens and fraud. The strict
construction of section 544(a)(3) led to the implementation of the policy of
ostensible ownership, and thereby, produced reliability and predictability in
the operation of the recording statutes. If attorneys and businesspeople
understand that bankruptcy statutes will be strictly enforced then they can
easily plan their transactions. An attorney who records his or her client's
interest correctly will not have to worry whether there are any equitable
exceptions that can destroy the validity of his or her client's interest. Therefore,
strict statutory construction produces reliability and predictability that is
essential to the operation of our economy.
F. Strict Statutory Construction Is Consistent with Commercial Law Policy
Strict statutory construction is also consistent with the policies underlying
commercial law. One of the goals of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter
U.C.C.) is to streamline, clarify, and modernize commercial law.149 U.C.C. §
1-103 governs the use of equity in cases controlled by the U.C.C. 150 and
provides that a court may not use equity to override a particular section of the
U.C.C.151 Courts have been adverse to using U.C.C. § 1-103 to overrule express
provisions of Article Nine of the U.C.C.152 For example, in Uniroyal, Inc. v.
149U.C.C. § 1-102(a); A.M. Knitwear Corp. v. All America Export-Import Corp., 359
N.E.2d 342, 346 (1976); 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102:45 (3d ed. 1981).
150U.C.C. Section 1-103 states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law of merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invali-
dating cause shall supplement its provisions.
U.C.C. § 1-103; see also THOMAS M. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY
AND LAW DIcEST § 1-103[A](1978).
151Arcon Constr. Co. v. South Dakota Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 412 (S.D.
1984)("In other words, general principles of law may only supplement the UCC to the
extent they are not displaced; they will not be applied where they conflict with particular
provisions of the UCC."); see also Farmers Livestock Exch. v. Ulmer, 393 N.W.2d 65, 70
(N.D. 1986); Kelly v. Miller, 575 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1978); Central Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Community Bank & Trust, 528P.2d 710,713 (Okla. 1974); National Shawmut
Bank v. Vera, 223 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Mass. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d
661,666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Palmer v. Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 641 P.2d 346,347-48 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1982).
1521n re California Pump & Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1978); Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Universal Tire & Auto Supply Co., 557 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Pacific Trencher &
Equip., Inc., 27 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), affd, 735 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 42:435
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/9
STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Universal Tire &Auto Supply C0.153 the issue before the First Circuit was whether
Uniroyal, Inc., had a perfected security interest. Uniroyal filed a financing
statement with the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and with
the Clerk of the City of Boston. The debtor's sole place of business was in
Brookline, which was just over the Boston-Brookline boundary. Since Uniroyal
did not file in Brookline, the First Circuit held that Uniroyal had an unperfected
security interest.154 The First Circuit reasoned that the Article Nine filing
requirements were clear, and that Uniroyal had failed to comply with them
because it failed to file in Brookline. 155 The court also rejected Uniroyal's
equitable arguments, and it stated:
Uniroyal has come up with no workable rationale for judicial
balancing of equities here, and the precedent either explicitly or
implicitly rejects that approach to enforcing the Code. Efforts by courts
to fashion equitable solutions to mitigate hardship on particular
creditors of literal application of statutory filing requirements would
have the deleterious effect of undermining the reliance which can be
placed on them. The harm would be more serious than the occasional
harshness resulting from strict enforcement. 15
6
The First Circuit's opinion embodies the belief that predictability is a vital
element of commercial law. The goal of predictability and reliability would be
undermined if courts were at liberty to deviate from the express text of the
U.C.C. The strict application of the law can produce harsh results.
Nevertheless, applying the U.C.C. inconsistently would wreak chaos and
destroy the purpose of enacting a comprehensive code that governs
commercial law.
Strict statutory construction in the context of bankruptcy law is an extension
of limiting the use of equity to override the express provisions of the U.C.C.
Bankruptcy is intended to provide a centralized forum in which creditors can
deal with a debtor who has committed multiple contractual defaults. In order
to have an efficient system, it is vital that the law be uniform so that the results
will be predictable, facilitating business planning and avoiding costly and
vexatious litigation. If the results in bankruptcy are dependent upon a judge's
sense of equity, then creditors might be adverse to participating in bankruptcy
cases because the outcome might be too risky or unpredictable. Further, some
debtors might be reluctant to file for bankruptcy because some judges might
be perceived as too procreditor and anti-debtor. Strict statutory construction
acts to ensure that the laws enacted by the legislature will be followed, and the
entitlements to property set forth in the U.C.C. and other nonbankruptcy law
153557 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977).
1 5 4 d. at 23.
155Id.
1561d. (citations omitted).
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will be observed in bankruptcy cases. Hence, strict statutory interpretation is
fundamental to the operation of bankruptcy and commercial law.
G. Strict Statutory Construction Precludes a Bankruptcy Court from Using its
Equitable Powers to Disregard the Clear Provisions of the Code
Strict statutory construction also limits a bankruptcy court's ability to
employ equity to circumvent the clear dictates of a statute. If a court is
permitted to use equity to disregard the clear terms of a statute, then it can
decide cases on the particular facts and make every decision an equitable
decision. Legislation would fall prey to the whims of the particular judge, and
the rule of law would be eviscerated.
For example, in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers157 the respondents were
family farmers who owed the Norwest Bank Worthington more than
$1,000,000. The respondents proposed a reorganization plan which permitted
them to retain their property. The petitioners contended that the respondents'
reorganization plan violated the absolute priority rule.158 The respondents
asserted the reorganization plan satisfied the new value exception to the
absolute priority rule because they were willing to contribute their labor,
experience and expertise in operating the farm. The Court had to determine
whether the respondents' pledge of their labor, experience and expertise
permitted the confirmation of their Chapter 11 case, even though their
reorganization plan violated the absolute priority rule. The Court held that the
respondents' promise of their future labor did not constitute an exception to
the absolute priority rule, and therefore, the Chapter 11 case should not have
been confirmed.159 The proposed reorganization plan violated the absolute
priority rule as codified in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 160 The respondents
attempted to advance various equitable arguments to justify the confirmation
of their reorganization plan; however, the Court rejected those arguments.161
The Court stated:
The short answer to these arguments is that whatever equitable powers
remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within
the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.16
2
157485 U.S. 197 (1988).
158Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) states:
the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or
interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
159485 U.S. at 199.
160 d. at 202.
161 d. at 206-07.
1621d. at 206.
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The Code permitted the creditors to reject the plan, and it was not for the courts
to override the creditors' decision.163 Rather, it was incumbent upon the
judiciary to effectuate the provisions of the Code. 164
The problem with employing equity to disregard clearly written statutes is
that it would produce havoc. A court would be able to consider the relative
equities of a case and render a decision that it thought was fair. A court's
decision would not be based on the letter of law. It would make it more difficult
for parties to plan their transactions because the outcome in bankruptcy court
would be dependent upon the judge's sense of fairness. The law could become
incoherent because many decisions would be fact specific. Strict statutory
construction is beneficial because it restricts a court's equitable powers and
compels the court to act within the dictates of the Code.
H. Strict Statutory Construction Prevents a Bankruptcy Court from Employing its
Equitable Powers to Create Substantive Rights
Strict statutory construction precludes a court from disregarding the express
language of a bankruptcy statute from using equity to create substantive
entitlements. In Gillis v. Califbrnia,165 a receiver was required by state law to
obtain a bond to operate the business. Unable to secure the bond, the receiver
requested permission from the district court to operate the business. Even
though 28 U.S.C. § 65 required a receiver to comply with all applicable local
and state health and safety statutes, the district court authorized the receiver
to operate the business without a bond. The Supreme Court held that the
district court lacked the jurisdiction to authorize the operation of the
business. 166 The Court reasoned that Congress had the authority to restrict the
district court's jurisdiction over receivers. 167 Judicial Code section 65 restricted
the district court's jurisdiction.168 There was no reason to preempt state law
because state law was not repugnant to federal law.169 A district court lacked
authority to use its equitable powers to disregard the explicit provisions
concerning the operation of receiverships.1 70 Therefore, absent a grant of
1631d. at 207.
164485 U.S. at 207.
165293 U.S. 62 (1934).
166 d. at 65.
16 7/d. at 66.
168 Id.
1 6 9 Id.
170The Court stated:
The accepted doctrine is that the lower federal courts were created by the
Acts of Congress and their powers and duties depend upon the acts which
called them into existence, or subsequent ones which extend or limit. What
ever may be the inherent power of a court incident to a grant of jurisdiction
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authority from Congress, a district court lacked the authority to create
substantive entitlements that were in contravention of federal and state law.
Gillis is significant because many businesses are subject to government
regulation. Bankruptcy is intended to govern debtor-creditor relationships, not
to permit a debtor to evade legitimate government regulation. Therefore, the
Code permits administrative agencies to enforce health and safety laws against
debtors.171 If a court is permitted to disregard the text of clear statutes, then a
court could use its inherent equitable powers to create substantive entitlements
such as licenses and permits. The effect would be that the bankruptcy court,
although it lacked the expertise, would be a super administrative agency
granting permits and licenses. Not only would this violate the separation of
powers and federalism doctrines, but also it could imperil public safety.
Consequently, strict statutory construction is vital to insure that bankruptcy
courts will not circumvent government regulation and create substantive
entitlements.
Similarly in Johnson v. First National Bank of Montevideo, Minnesota,172 the
debtors sought an injunction to toll indefinitely the expiration of the statutory
period of redemption. The debtors alleged that they had equity in their
property. Under state law the debtors had one year after the foreclosure sale to
redeem their property. Section 108(b) granted the debtors a sixty-day extension
of the state redemption period. The bankruptcy court issued an injunction,
which indefinitely suspended the statutory period of redemption, and the
district court affirmed the decision.
The Eighth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court may not use its equitable
powers under section 105(a) to toll the expiration of the statutory redemption
period created under state law in connection with real estate mortgages. 173 It
noted that, although, section 105(a) vested a bankruptcy court with broad
equitable powers,174 this provision was not unlimited, especially when
property rights created and defined by state law are concerned.175 Further,
unless there is conflict between state and federal law, state law governs the issue
S. . there seems no ground whatever for saying that Congress cannot
withhold or withdraw from courts of equity the right to empower
receivers in conservation proceedings to disregard local statutes.
293 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted).
171See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4) - 362(b)(5) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
172719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
1731d. at 278-79.
1741d. at 273.
175 The court stated:
Although § 105(a) is in certain respects broader in scope than its pre-
decessor, the general equitable powers granted to the bankruptcy court
by the statute are not unlimited, particularly in instances where property
rights created and defined by state law are involved.
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of property rights. 176 In Butner v. United States,177 the Supreme Court held that
in a bankruptcy case property rights are created and defined by nonbankruptcy
law, which is usually state law.178 Therefore, under Butner, absent a specific
grant of power from Congress or extraordinary circumstances, a bankruptcy
court may not exercise its equitable powers to create substantive rights which
do not exist under state law.179
The Eighth Circuit concluded that a bankruptcy court may not employ
section 105(a) to toll the running of the statutory redemption period,180 and
that the case lacked the exceptional circumstances necessary to invoke the
equitable power of the bankruptcy court.181 Moreover, the debtors failed to
identify any federal interest which would justify interfering with state law.182
The court held that the bankruptcy court erred in using section 105(a) to
suspend the running of the statutory redemption period.183
As the preceding discussion reflects, a bankruptcy court, like all federal
courts, is a court of limited jurisdiction. Strict statutory construction insures
that a bankruptcy court will exercise its jurisdiction within the boundaries
delineated by Congress, prevents a bankruptcy court from exercising its
equitable powers beyond the limits set forth in the Code, and thereby,
176 The Eighth Circuit wrote:
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that Congress
shall have the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the
United States. Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority,
contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. It is equally
well-settled, however, that state laws are suspended only to the extent
of actual conflict with the bankruptcy system provided by Congress, so
that in the absence of any actual conflict between state and bankruptcy
laws, the law of the state where the property is situated governs questions
of property rights.
Id.
177440 U.S. 48 (1979).
178Johnson, 719 F.2d at 273-74.
17 9The court remarked:
To conclude otherwise, and thus to hold that a bankruptcy court may as
a matter of course, suspend the running of a statutory period of redemp-
tion pursuant to § 105(a), would be to enlarge the debtor's property rights
beyond those specifically set forth by the Minnesota legislature and by
Congress in § 108(b). Despite the broad equitable powers bestowed by
§ 105(a), we therefore find ourselves in agreement with those courts
which have held that § 105(a) may not be invoked to toll or suspend the
running of a statutory period of redemption absent, fraud, mistake,
accident, or erroneous conduct on the part of the foreclosing officer.
Id. at 274.
180Id.
181Id.
182 Id. at 275.
183 Johnson, 719 F.2d at 275.
19941
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
unnecessarily preempting state law, and hinders a bankruptcy court from
creating substantive entitlements. Unregulated discretion would enable a
bankruptcy court to disregard federal and state law and create substantive
entitlements, which is contrary to bankruptcy policy.184 A court's decision
would be dependent upon who was the judge, rather than upon the dictates
of the Code. Creditors and debtors would be adverse to participating in
bankruptcy cases because creditors or debtors could receive windfalls, which
would destroy the collective nature of bankruptcy.185 Thus, an important
policy which holds that bankruptcy should be a mechanism for enforcing
entitlements against a debtor's property would be severely undermined.
I. Congressional Action Can Remedy Unpopular or Incorrect Decisions
Congress may not have envisioned that when it enacted a particular law it
would be applied to a particular situation. Under these circumstances, the strict
application of the law might produce unpopular results. When Congress thinks
that the judiciary has misinterpreted the Code, Congress has the option of
enacting legislation to overrule a judicial decision.
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,186 the debtor obtained permission from the
bankruptcy court to reject a collective bargaining agreement with Local 408 of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (hereinafter Local 408). The debtor
had also unilaterally modified the terms of its collective bargaining agreement
with Local 408.187 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine what
was the correct standard for determining whether a collective bargaining
agreement should be rejected and to determine other important bankruptcy
and labor law issues.188 The Court held that collective bargaining agreements
could be rejected under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).189 The Court also held that the
balancing of the equities was the correct standard for determining whether a
collective bargaining agreement should be rejected. 190 Finally, the Court ruled
184 The Supreme Court has stated:
Property interest are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of
property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves
to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance
of bankruptcy.'
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,55 (1979).
185JAcxsoN, supra note 2, at 20-21.
186465 U.S. 513 (1984).
187 Id.
188Id.
189 d. at 521-23.
190 d. at 523-27.
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that a debtor did not commit an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally
modified the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.191
Organized labor thought that the Bildisco decision was horrendous, and it
immediately sought legislation to overrule it.192 Within five months after
Bildisco was decided, organized labor and its supporters were able to enact
section 1113 which was intended to modify Bildisco.193 Section 1113 sets forth
a new procedure for modifying a collective bargaining agreement, 194 and it
prohibits a debtor from unilaterally modifying a collective bargaining
agreement. 195 In addition, section 1113(c) enacted a new substantive standard
for the modification of collective bargaining agreements.196 The enactment of
section 1113 proves Congress can easily and quickly amend the Code when it
disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Code.
Another example of Congress legislatively overruling a controversial
decision is Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.197 In Lubrizol
the debtor had entered into a nonexclusive technology licensing agreement
with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 and sought to
reject the technology licensing agreement with Lubrizol. The debtor attempted
to reject the agreement so that it would be able to sell or license the technology
without being hindered by the restrictive provisions of the Lubrizol agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the agreement was
executory, and therefore, it was within the purview of section 365(a). 198 The
Fourth Circuit, moreover, ruled that under the business judgment test, the
debtor was entitled to reject the agreement because the estate would benefit
191465 U.S. at 532-34.
192 Rosiland Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement - A Brief
Lesson in the Use of The Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L. J.
293, 294 (1984).
193Carlos J. Cuevas, Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: A
Search for the Substantive Standard for Modification of a Collective Bargaining Agreement in
a Corporate Reorganization, 64 AM. BANKR. L. J. 133, 162-63 (1990); Judith DeMeester
Nichols, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors: The
Necessity Requirement Under Section 1113, 21 GA. L. REV. 967, 986 (1987).
194 Ehrenwerth & Lally-Green, supra note 125, at 950-51.
19511 U.S.C. § 1113(0 (1988).
196Richard H. Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113,58 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325,335 (1984); Mark S.
Pulliam, The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bildisco and the Legislative Response,
1985 LABOR L. J. 390, 397-98.
Under § 1113(c) a debtor must make a proposal that satisfies the requirements of§ 1113(b)(1); the authorized representative must have rejected the proposal without
good cause; and the balance of the equities must clearly favor the rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (1988).
197756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
1981d. at 1046.
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from the rejection of the agreement.199 The court strictly construed section
365(a) and was adverse to creating any exceptions for technology licensing
agreements.200 The court reasoned that no matter how harsh the consequences,
it was not within the judiciary's power to deviate from the dear language of a
statute.20 1
The Lubrizol decision generated a significant amount of controversy.
Businesses that were dependent upon technology licensing agreements viewed
themselves as extremely vulnerable because the contracts upon which their
companies were founded could be easily rejected in bankruptcy cases. The
Lubrizol case led to an effort to create a special provision for the rejection of
technology licensing agreements.2 ° 2 Congress enacted section 365(n) to
overrule the Lubrizol decision.203 The purpose of section 365(n) is to mitigate
the damage that could result to a licensee when a licensor rejected a technology
licensing agreement.
The literal interpretation of statutes can have harsh consequences. Courts
sometimes will have to apply statutes to situations which were not foreseen by
the legislature at the time the legislation was enacted. Nonetheless, if a court
issues a harsh decision because the results are considered inequitable or
contrary to public policy, then Congress can enact a new law and overrule the
judicial decision. As the section concerning public choice theory illustrates,
parties adversely affected by bankruptcy decisions can lobby Congress to enact
1991d. at 1047.
2 00Id. at 1045.
201The court wrote:
It cannot be gainsaid that allowing rejection of such contracts as
executoryimposes serious burdens upon contracting parties such as
Lubrizol. Nor can it be doubted that allowing rejection in this and
comparable cases could have a general chilling effect upon the
willingness of such parties to contract at all with businesses in
possible financial difficulty. But under bankruptcy law such
equitable considerations may not be indulged by courts in respect
of the type of contract here in issue. Congress has plainly provided
for the rejection of executory contracts, notwithstanding the obvious
adverse consequences for contracting parties thereby made inevitable.
Awareness by Congress of those consequences is indeed specifically
reflected in the special treatment accorded to union members under
collective bargaining contracts... and to lessees of real property...
But no comparable special treatment is provided for technology licensees
such as Lubrizol. They share the general hazards created by § 365 for all
business entities dealing with potential bankrupts in the respects at issue
here.
Id. at 1048.
202S. REP. No. 505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3200, 3203.
2 03WENTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 69, 7.10[111]; John J. Fry, Note, The Rejection of
Executory Contracts Under the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 37
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 621, 622 (1989).
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legislation overruling the bankruptcy decision. Indeed, public choice theory
predicts that the interested parties will intensely lobby Congress to enact new
legislation.
Congress has the resources to study problems caused by bankruptcy
decisions that should be addressed by legislation. If a judicial decision does
produce a problem, Congress can address the particular issue or it can address
the issue in a comprehensive manner by enacting legislation that will not only
deal with the issue but also with any collateral issues that involve the entire
Code.
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF STRICT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
This section examines the problems that strict statutory interpretation can
produce. In particular, strict statutory construction does not work well when a
public policy issue is involved. Further, an unrelenting adherence to strict
statutory interpretation can produce absurd results and inhibit the
development of bankruptcy law. Strict statutory interpretation also requires
that Congress be willing to constantly amend the bankruptcy laws, which can
be an unrealistic expectation. Finally, plain meaning can produce incorrect
results because a literalist approach can produce an incorrect interpretation of
a statute.
B. Plain Meaning Can Produce Horrendous Results Because the Court Is
Constrained to Ignore the Policy Implications of its Decision
Strict statutory interpretation works well in the context of commercial law
because it produces the predictability and reliability that is necessary for our
economy to function. However, it can produce terrible policy results when it
precludes a court from considering the policy implications of its decision. For
example, in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport204 the
respondents pleaded guilty to welfare fraud. As part of a condition of
probation, the respondents were ordered to make monthly restitution
payments to the county probation department, which would forward the
payments to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. The issue before
the Court was whether criminal restitution obligations were dischargeable in
Chapter 13 cases.205 The Supreme Court held that, based on the language and
structure of the Code, criminal restitution obligations were dischargeable in
Chapter 13 cases.206 Under section 101(11) a debt was a liability on a claim,
and this definition indicated that the meaning of debt and claim were synon-
204495 U.S. 552 (1990).
205Id. at 555.
206Id.
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yMous. 207 The concept of claim was not restrictive, but rather, it was
expansive.2 08 The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that criminal
restitution orders were not a right to payment under the Court's prior decision
in Kelly v. Robinson.2 09 Instead, given the plain meaning of section 101(4)(A),
the Supreme Court concluded that criminal restitution orders came within the
purview of the statute.2 10 Congress, apparently, made a conscious decision in
permitting the discharge of criminal restitution obligations by making section
523(a)(7) inapplicable to Chapter 13 cases.2 11 Thus, the Court concluded that
criminal restitution obligations were dischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.
Davenport was an invitation for criminals to file for Chapter 13 so that they
could discharge their criminal restitution obligations. The Court failed to
consider the policy implications and consequences of its decision because in
interpreting the statute it solely used the plain meaning of the text. Congress
made a policy decision that it would afford a Chapter 13 debtor a more liberal
discharge.2 12 The Court was going to enforce that policy decision. As Davenport
reflects, strict statutory construction leaves the court, as the agent of Congress,
with little discretion to make the law adapt to the needs of society.
In strictly construing the statute, the Court ignored two important policies
underlying bankruptcy. First, criminal restitution obligations historically have
been held to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy cases. 2 13 Secondly, federal
207Id. at 558.
2081d.
209479 U.S. 36 (1986).
210Justice Marshall stated:
Contrary to petitioners' argument, however, the Court's prior character-
ization of the purposes underlying restitution orders does not bear on
our construction of the phrase 'right to payment' in § 101 (4)(A). The
Court in Kelly analyzed the purposes of restitution in construing the
qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7), which explicitly tie the application of
that provision to the purpose of the compensation required. But the
language employed to define 'claim' in § 101(4)(A) makes no reference
to purpose. The plain meaning of a 'right to payment' is nothing more
nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives the
State seeks to serve in imposing the obligation.
495 U.S. at 559.
2 11Id. at 562-63.
2 12At the time Davenport was determined criminal restitution obligations were
nondischargeable in Chapter 7. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(7) (1988). In addition, certain provisions, §§ 523(a)(2),(a)(4), (a)(6) and (a)(8)
which prohibited the discharge of certain debts were not applicable in Chapter 13.
Congress made a deliberate decision to make the Chapter 13 discharge provisions more
liberal than the discharge provisions in Chapter 7.
213Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 45-46 (1986). In Kelly, the Court quoted a New York
Supreme Court's language in State v. Mosesson:
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever upon a condition
of restitution of a criminal sentence. A bankruptcy proceeding is civil in
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courts have been adverse to interfering with state criminal proceedings. 214 In
the past, the Court has been unwilling to infer such a radical departure from
prior practice unless Congress unequivocally indicates that it has repealed the
preexisting common law.215 There was no cogent evidence that Congress
repealed the exception to criminal restitution obligations. The Court could have
avoided using strict statutory construction. Subsequently, Congress enacted
legislation which legislatively overruled Davenport.216
C. Strict Statutory Interpretation May Produce Absurd Results
Another difficulty with strict statutory interpretation is that the literal
application of the law may produce absurd results. This result may be the case
even when there is no significant public policy issue involved in the litigation.
For example, Congress enacted section 365(d)(4) as part of the 1984
amendments.217 There has been a dispute as to whether a debtor must have
the entire motion adjudicated within the initial sixty day period after the entry
nature and is intended to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his
debts and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A condition of
restitution in a sentence of probation is a part of the judgment of convic-
tion. It does not create a debt nor a debtor-creditor relationship between
the persons making and receiving restitution. As with any other condition
of a probationary sentence it is intended as a means to insure the defend-
ant will lead a lawabiding life thereafter. State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc.2d
217,218,356 N.Y.S.2d, 483 483-84 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1974).
479 U.S. at 46.
2 14The Court has stated:
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis for this judicial
exception, a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not
invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings. The right to formulate
and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty
retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly 'the funda-
mental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecu-
tions.' Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,46 (1971).
Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
2 15Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986).
216 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1990, and criminal restitution
obligations are nondischargeable in Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1988).
21 7Section 365(d)(4) states:
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within
60 days after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time
as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is
deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such non-
residential real property to the lessor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988).
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of the order for relief or whether it is sufficient if the motion is simply made
within the initial sixty day period after the entry of the order for relief.218
The minority position, as reflected in In re House of Deals of Broward, Inc.219
is that the motion must be adjudicated within the initial sixty day period. In
House of Deals the debtor filed for Chapter 11 on May 19, 1986. Thereafter, on
July 17,1986, the debtor moved by order to show cause for an order extending
its time to assume or reject a sublease. The court heard the motion on August
6,1986. The court held that the lease was deemed rejected by operation of law
because the motion was not adjudicated within the sixty day period after the
entry of the order for relief.220 The court ruled that language of the statute was
clear.22 1 The word "assumption" not only required that the debtor make the
motion, but also required that the court grant the motion within the initial sixty
day period.222 The court would not adopt a different interpretation because it
thought that its interpretation of the provision was consistent with the
legislative history of the statute.223
The problem with the court's rigid interpretation of section 365(d)(4) was
that there were two highly plausible interpretations of the statute. The
interpretation the court rejected would not have produced an arbitrary result,
and still would have effectuated congressional intent. The majority view is that
to satisfy section 365(d)(4) one has to make a motion prior to the expiration of
the sixty day period.224 The language of the statute can be read as to only
require the making of a motion within the sixty day period.2 25 The major
problem is that the minority position's interpretation would produce arbitrary
218 A majority of courts have held that under § 365(d)(4) it is sufficient if the trustee
serves a motion within the initial sixty day period. E.g., In re American Healthcare
Management, Inc., 900 F.2d 827, 833 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Victoria Station, Inc., 875 F.2d
1380,1386 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Southwest Aircraft Servs., Inc., 831 F.2d 848,853 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 US. 1206 (1988); In re Southern Technical College, Inc., 148 B.R.
550,551-52 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992); In re Perfectlite Co., 116 B.R. 84,88 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990); In re Garrett Rd. Supermarket, Inc., 95 B.R. 902, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
By-Rite Distrib., Inc., 55 B.R. 740,745 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re Wedtech Corp., 72 B.R.
464,468 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). The minority position is that to comply with § 365(d)(4)
a motion has to be served and adjudicated within the initial sixty day period after the
entry of the motion for relief. E.g., In re House of Deals of Broward, Inc., 67 B.R. 23, 24
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Coastal Indus., Inc., 58 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
21967 B.R. at 25.
22 01d. at 24-25.
22 1 1d. at 24.
22 2 1d. at 25.
223 Id.
22 41n re Southwest Aircraft Servs., Inc., 831 F.2d 848, 849 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1206 (1988).
22 51d. at 850.
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results.226 It is conceivable that a debtor could make a motion the day it filed
for Chapter 11; however, due to calendar congestion, the debtor might be
unable to obtain a return date for its motion until after the termination of the
sixty day period. The debtor would automatically forfeit its lease. The debtor
could lose a major asset, and the landlord receive a windfall due to
circumstances beyond the debtor's control. A lease forfeiture could also harm
the unsecured creditors because the lease might be the estate's most valuable
asset. The unsecured creditors might depend on the sale of the lease as the
means of funding a plan. If there are two plausible interpretations of a statute,
a court should select the interpretation which avoids producing the harsher
result.22 7 There should not be a blind adherence to strict statutory construction
because an unrelenting adherence to strict statutory construction can produce
harsh and arbitrary results.
D. Strict Statutory Construction May Inhibit the Development of Bankruptcy Law
and Policy
When Congress enacts particular bankruptcy legislation it cannot envision
all the circumstances that will arise from a dynamic economy. The plain
meaning rule may inhibit the judiciary's ability to adapt to the changes in
society because under plain meaning the court is restricted to the literal
meaning of a statute. Under plain meaning the court is prohibited from
engaging in dynamic 22 8 or nautical 229 statutory interpretation because the
court would deviate from the plain meaning of the statute.
2261d.
22 7public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); Grand ex
rel. United States v. Northrop Corp., 811 F. Supp. 333,335 (S.D. Ohio 1992). As Professor
Sunstein has suggested the canons of construction are being used to supplement the text
of a statute because the canons assist the judges in construing the statutes. Sunstein,
supra note 57, at 452-53. In this case, the canon regarding the avoidance of absurd results
acts as a gap filler to insure that the plausible construction that does not produce an
arbitrary result is selected.
228 Professor Eskridge has espoused the theory of dynamic statutory interpretation
under which statutory interpretation involves the reconciliation of three factors: 1) the
statutory text; 2) the original legislative expectations surrounding the enactment of the
statute; and 3) the subsequent evolution of the statute in the context of the present.
Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1483.
229The nautical theory has been described as the following:
Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the ship's ports-of-
call, safe harbors, and ultimate destination may be a product of the ship's
captain, the weather, and other factors not identified at the time the ship
sets sail. This model understands a statute as an on-going process (a
voyage) in which both the shipbuilder and subsequent navigators play a
role. The dimensions and structure of the craft determine where it is
capable of going, but the current course is set primarily by the crew on
board.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20,21 (1987).
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A case that illustrates how strict statutory construction can inhibit the
development of bankruptcy law is Johnson v. Home State Bank.230 In Johnson the
debtor entered into a loan transaction with the respondent. The debtor
borrowed $470,000 from the respondent, and he gave the respondent a
mortgage on farm property to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan,
and the respondent commenced a foreclosure action. While the foreclosure
proceeding was pending, the debtor filed for Chapter 7. The debtor obtained a
discharge of his personal liability on his obligations to the respondent. The
automatic stay was subsequently lifted in the Chapter 7 case, and the
respondent obtained an in rem judgment for approximately $200,000. Before
the foreclosure sale could take place, the debtor filed for Chapter 13. The debtor
listed the mortgage against the farm property as a claim against his estate, and
he proposed to pay the respondent's claim in his Chapter 13 plan. The
bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. The respondent
appealed to the district court, and the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court. The district court held that the Code did not permit a Chapter 13 debtor
to include a mortgage for which the personal liability had been discharged in
a Chapter 7 case. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuit
Courts of Appeal.
The Supreme Court held that a debtor may include a mortgage lien in a
Chapter 13 plan once the personal obligation secured by the mortgaged
property has been discharged in a Chapter 7 case.23 1 The Chapter 7 discharge
only discharged the debtor's personal liability, and prevents a creditor from
recovering any deficiency against the debtor's assets. 232 Nevertheless, the
mortgagee's right to foreclose against the mortgaged property survives the
Chapter 7 case.2 3 The plain meaning of section 101(5) reflects that mortgage
interest is a claim against the debtor.234 This conclusion was buttressed by the
Court's decision in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,235 in
which the Court held that Congress intended to adopt the broadest possible
definition of "claim"236 as an enforceable obligation.2 37 The Court concluded
that a claim in bankruptcy embraced a mortgage interest, even though the
230501 U.S. 78 (1991).
23 11d. at 80.
23 21d. at 82.
23 3 d. at 83.
2 341d.
235495 U.S. 552 (1990).
236Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84.
237 d.
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debtor's personal liability had been discharged. 238 Thus, the surviving
mortgage interest is a claim.239
The Court also used holistic statutory construction, and it thought that its
holding that a mortgage interest is a claim was consistent with other sections
of the Code.240 It found additional support for its holding in the legislative
history of the Code because the legislative history reflected that Congress
intended to expand the definition of a claim.241 The Court, moreover, was
adverse to prohibiting Chapter 20 cases because there was no indication that
Congress intended to prohibit Chapter 20 cases.242 The Court thought that the
Code contained sufficient remedies, such as the good faith test, to police
debtors who attempted to abuse Chapter 20.243
Basing its holding on the text and structure of the Code, the Court failed to
address the policy ramifications, and therefore, missed an opportunity to
develop bankruptcy jurisprudence. Chapter 20 is a recent phenomenon, and
therefore, Congress did not address the problem when it enacted the Code.
There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the
problem of Chapter 20 and approved of the practice. The Court could have
examined the Chapter 20 issue by exploring the good faith issue and the
policies underlying the Code. For example, creditor protection and the
protection of the creditor's bargain is an important policy which permeates
bankruptcy.244 Another significant policy underlying bankruptcy is equity, and
2 38The Court stated:
Even after the debtor's personal obligations have been extinguished,
the mortgage holder still retains a 'right to payment' in the form of its
right to the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's property. Alterna-
tively, the creditor's surviving right to foreclose on the mortgage can
be viewed as a 'right to an equitable remedy' for the debtor's default
on the underlying obligation. Either way, there can be no doubt that
the surviving mortgage interest corresponds to an 'enforceable
obligation' of the debtor.
Id.
23 91d. at 84-85.
2401d. at 85.
24 1Johnson, 501 U.S. at 85.
242 The Court stated:
Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings. The
absence of a like prohibition on serial filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 petitions, combined with the evident care with which Congress
fashioned these express prohibitions, convinces us that Congress did
not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 reorgan-
izations to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7 relief.
Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
2431d. at 87.
2 44JACKSON, supra note 2, at 20-23.
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that a debtor has to treat his or her creditors fairly and honestly.245 Finally, there
is the fresh start policy, which enables an honest debtor to discharge his or her
debts and start anew.246 The Court failed to discuss these policies and how
these policies should be considered in the context of a Chapter 20 case.
In a Chapter 20 case, the debtor is able to discharge her unsecured debt and
promissory note relating to the mortgage in the Chapter 7 case. Then in the
Chapter 13 case the debtor is able to save her house by paying the mortgage
arrearages in a Chapter 13 plan. Chapter 20 permits the debtor to discharge all
of her unsecured debt and retain her most valuable asset, her residence. The
debtor is permitted to have her cake and eat it. Under these circumstances, a
debtor is not receiving a fresh start, but a head start. It is inequitable to permit
a debtor to receive a Chapter 7 discharge, and then permit her to retain her
home through a Chapter 13 plan. Furthermore, not only are the general
unsecured creditors harmed, but also the mortgagee is harmed in Chapter 20
cases. As part of the mortgage transaction, the mortgagee bargained for the
debtor's personal liability. If the value of the property decreases and the sale
of the property fails to satisfy the outstanding debt, then the mortgagee should
be permitted to pursue the debtor for the deficiency. This is simply what the
parties bargained for in the mortgage transaction. Such exploitation of the
bankruptcy process by a debtor is bad faith. If the debtor intends to use
bankruptcy to save her house she should be compelled to file for Chapter 13,
she should not have the option of using Chapter 20.
The Court, thus, missed an opportunity to make an important policy
pronouncement regarding serial filings and the good faith requirement.
Instead, it elected to mechanically interpret the Code, and thereby, stunt the
development of bankruptcy policy. The Court should have engaged in either
nautical247 or dynamic 248 statutory interpretation. Congress failed to address
the issue of whether Chapter 20 is permissible. One should not infer
Congressional approval regarding Chapter 20 because of legislative silence as
an indication that Congress has approved of Chapter 20 because there is no
evidence in the text or legislative history that Congress has contemplated or
debated the issue. The Court should have used the good faith test to determine
whether Chapter 20 was permissible. The Court would not have been engaged
in judicial legislation because Congress has expressed its disdain for serial
filings,249 and sections 1307(c) and 1325(a)(3) grant a court the authority to
24 5WENTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 69, 1.0211]; MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK,
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 2-3 (1987).
246 DouGLAs G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTSOF BANKRUPTCY 27-29 (1992); 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN
ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 8.1 (1992).
247Aleinikoff, supra note 229, at 21.
248 Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1483.
249 Section 109(g) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual or
family farmer may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor
in a case pending under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if-
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determine the appropriateness of a filing and make policy. Hence, a rigid
interpretation of the Code can stifle the development of bankruptcy law and
policy.
Another example of how strict statutory construction restricts the
development of bankruptcy law and policy is the treatment of technology
licensing agreements. When Congress enacted the Code, technology licensing
agreements were not a major issue, and therefore, they did not receive special
treatment. In Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,25o the
issue before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) a debtor was permitted to reject a technology licensing agreement. The
court held that the agreement was executory, and therefore, it was within the
purview of section 365(a). 251 The court strictly interpreted section 365(a) and
determined that it would not create any exceptions for technology licensing
agreements.252
Under the plain meaning rule the court was constrained to follow the plain
meaning of section 365(a). Congress had not specifically provided an
exemption for technology licensing agreements; therefore, a debtor was
permitted to reject them. Unfortunately, as reflected in Lubrizol, the plain
meaning rule can produce harsh results, which can undermine society's
confidence in the judicial system to render justice. Under section 365(a), a
technology licensee's business could be destroyed because a technology
licensor could readily reject the contract upon which the licensee's business
was predicated. Further, an unrelenting adherence to the plain meaning rule
can thwart the courts' ability to adapt the law to the needs of a dynamic
economy. Under these circumstances, a court would appropriately engage in
either nautical or dynamic statutory interpretation. Under such circumstances,
the court would be using the common law process to meet the needs of
society.25 3 The court would not be usurping the legislature's authority because
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to
abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prose-
cution of the case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case
following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided
by section 362 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (1988).
250756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
2511d. at 1046.
252 d. at 1048.
253For example, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) permits a debtor to reject an executory contract or
expired lease. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). However, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) is silent regarding the
terms and conditions for rejecting an executory contract. MURPHY, supra note 128, § 9.03.
Courts have the authority to determine under what circumstances a debtor may reject
an executory contract. Therefore, courts have prevented solvent debtors from rejecting
executory contracts. See In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 478
U.S. 1028 (1986); In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re
Meehan, 59 B.R. 380,385 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The court is using the discretion conferred in
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the legislature never addressed the issue. Therefore, although the plain
meaning rule can insure predictability and reliability, at times, there is a high
price to pay for employing it.
E. Congress May Be Slow or Fail to Respond to a Problem that a Decision Has
Created
The legislature may either be slow in responding to a problem that a judicial
decision has created or the legislature may not respond at all.254 In Levit v.
Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.,255 V.N. Deprizio Construction Co. (hereinafter
the Construction Company) borrowed money from different sources. 256 In
order to obtain these loans the Construction Company's principals had to
execute personal guarantees, which guaranteed the Construction Company's
obligations to the lenders.257 Under the Code, the Construction Company's
principals qualified as insiders.258 Subsequently, the Construction Company
filed for bankruptcy, and a trustee was appointed.259 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b),260 the trustee commenced an adversary proceeding to recover
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) to engage in dynamic or nautical statutory interpretation, and thus,
make 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) meet the needs of a changing society.
254 Professor Jonakait has made the following remarks concerning the plain meaning
rule in the context of interpreting evidence rules:
The plain-meaning standard will do more than just transform the evi-
dentiary landscape; it will also freeze the new forms into unchanging
shapes. Once we discover the most natural reading of the Federal Rules
of Evidence's words and clauses, the law will be fixed until Congress
acts. And Congress will not act often. 'One of the facts of legislative
life, at least in this country in this century, is that getting a statute en-
acted in the first place is much easier than getting the statute revised
so that it will make sense in the light of changed conditions.'
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEx. L. REv. 745, 784 (1990).
255874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
2 561d. at 1187.
2 571d.
2 58Section 101(31)(B) states:
(31) 'insider' includes-
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control
of the debtor;
11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (1988).
259874 F.2d at 1188.
26 0Section 547(b) states:
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preferences from the lenders and other parties. The trustee took the position
that the preference period should be extended to one year for the lenders who
had obtained personal guarantees from the Construction Company's insiders.
The bankruptcy court rejected the trustee's position and dismissed the
adversary proceeding. The district court reversed, and the case went to the
Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit held that the preference period could be extended to one
year for creditors of a corporation who had obtained a personal guarantee from
an insider.261 The court relied on the plain meaning of the applicable Code
Sections, and the structure of the Code.262 Under the Code, a guarantor is a
contingent creditor until the corporate debt is repaid.263 Every payment the
corporation makes benefits the insider because it reduces the insider's
liability.264 Therefore, the payments are avoidable under section
547(b)(4)-(B).265 Section 550(a)(1) 266 permits a trustee to recover a preferential
transfer from the initial transferee or the entity for whose benefit the transfer
was made.267 Therefore, the trustee was permitted to recover a preferential
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
261874 F.2d at 1200-01.
2621d. at 1188-89.
263 d. at 1190.
264Id.
265Id.
26 6Section 550(a)(1) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a)
of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the
property transferred, or if the court so orders the value of such property,
from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made;
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
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payment made beyond the 90 day period before the commencement of the case
from a noninsider creditor.
The Levit decision generated a significant amount of controversy.268 Some
courts have refused to follow Levit because they have thought that it incorrectly
interprets the Code and also because it misconstrues bankruptcy policy.269 As
Levit reflects, a major problem with mechanically applying the plain meaning
rule is that it ignores the policy implications of a particular case. Personal
guarantees play a significant role in the financing of closely held corporations,
and the effect of Levit is to reduce the value of personal guarantees and make
it harder for closely held corporations to obtain financing. Even though there
was a strong cry to legislatively overrule Levit, it took Congress five years to
overrule Levit.2 70
F. Context Is Necessary for Interpretation of Statutes
Strict statutory construction can be deficient because words do not have
meanings by themselves.271 Rather, it is necessary to understand the context in
which the legislature was acting to comprehend the meaning of the text of a
statute.272 An example of the use of legislative history in the context of
commercial law is the Official Comments to the U.C.C.273 The Official
Comments perform an indispensable role in the interpretation of the U.C.C.
because they provide context and guidance for the reader.274 The Official
267Id.
268 Robert F. Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is There A One-Year Preference Period for
Non-Insiders?, 64 AM. BANKR. L. J. 383 (1990); John S. Cullina, Note, Recharacterizing
Insider Preferences as Fraudulent Conveyances: A Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand,
77 VA. L. REV. 149 (1991); Mark E. Toth, Comment, The Impossible State of Preference Law
Under the Bankruptcy Code: Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. and the Problem of
Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 1155.
2691n re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 119 B.R. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re J.T.L.
Supermarket Corp., 145 B.R. 3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992);In reArundelHous. Components,
Inc., 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
27 OBankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)
legislatively overruled Levit.
271Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply to Stanley Fish, 72 TEX. L. REV. 67,
68 (1993); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).
272 Professor Fiss has written, "Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the
process by which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an
authoritative legal text and values embodied in the text." Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982).
273 Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1966 WIs. L. REV. 597, 606-09.
274 Professor Karl Llewellyn made the following remarks concerning the use of the
Official Comments to the U.C.C.:
'Every provision should show its reason on its face. Every body of provi-
sions should display on their face their organizing principle. The rationale
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Comments of the U.C.C. furnish the reader with an understanding of the
problems that the particular Code section was intended to address. 275
Although the drafters of the U.C.C. labored to devise a comprehensive
commercial code, they understood that the lawyers and judges who would
interpret the U.C.C. needed some type of legislative history in order to interpret
the words of the various sections.
The failure to refer to legislative history may lead to the courts
misinterpreting a statute. The mechanical application of the plain meaning rule
may lead to incorrect results. In Levit,2 76 the Seventh Circuit mechanically
applied the plain meaning rule to the text of sections 547(b) and 550(a), and it
held that the preference period could be extended to one year for a creditor
whose debt was guaranteed by an insider.2 77 The major problem of Levit was
that it had an adverse impact on small business financing because personal
guarantees from insiders are of little or no value.2 78 Yet, the strict
of that is that construction and application are intellectually impossible
except with reference to some reason and theory of purpose and organ-
ization. Borderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are inevitable.
Reasonably uniform interpretation by judges of different schooling,
learning and skill is tremendously furthered if the reason which guides
application of the same language is the same reason in all cases. A
patent reason, moreover, tremendously decreases the leeway open to
the skillful advocate for persuasive distortion or misapplication of the
language; it requires that any contention, to be successfully persuasive,
must make some kind of sense in terms of the reason; it provides a real
stimulus toward, though not an assurance of, corrective growth rather
than straightjacketing of the Code by way of case-law.'
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 12 (3d ed. 1988).
2 75 ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 32-34 (1977).
276874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
277 Id. at 1200-01.
278 0ne commentator noted:
The application of the literal-reading approach has an adverse effect
on the financial market. Under a legal regime applying the literal-
reading approach, the Outside Creditor's act in taking an insider
guarantee significantly increases his aggregate risk in lending the
funds. The Outside Creditor is subject not only to the risk that the
Insider Guarantor will not be able to satisfy any remaining balance
owed by the debtor as of the date of bankruptcy, but also to the risk
that he will have to disgorge all payments received during the entire
year, rather than those received just ninety days prior to bankruptcy,
and then that he will be unable to obtain reimbursement from the
Insider Guarantor. This additional exposure induces an Outside
Creditor either to (i) continue to take insider guarantees, but demand
higher interest rates to compensate for the additional risks, or (ii)
refuse to accept insider guarantees, which will foreclose debtors that
depend on insider guarantees from obtaining financing in the debt
market.
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constructionists fail to adequately address the policy ramifications of their
decision. Furthermore, although the strict constructionists contend that they
are effectuating congressional intent by strictly enforcing sections 547(b) and
550(a), there is little evidence that Congress intended or sought the results
produced by Levit.279 The court failed to address the issue of whether Congress
intended to extend the preference period to one year for creditors whose
obligations were guaranteed by insiders.280 There is nothing in the legislative
history which suggests that Congress intended that creditors who had obtained
a guarantee from an insider should be held to a one year preference period.281
Commercial statutes are not applied in a vacuum, but rather, are applied in a
constantly changing world. Legislative history serves as a context under which
the judges and attorneys can understand the intent of the statute and the
meaning of the words used in the text of the statute. Levit reflects that the
mechanical application of a statute can produce decisions which do not reflect
congressional intent because Congress never envisioned that a particular
statute would be applied to a particular situation.282 Therefore, plain meaning
does not always produce outcomes which are consistent with congressional
intent.
G. Analysis
Strict statutory construction fails to vest the judiciary with sufficient
discretion to enable it to adapt the law to meet the needs of an evolving society.
There will be instances where Congress did not anticipate that a particular
statute would be applied to a particular problem, and in these instances the
rigid application of the law will produce poor decisions. In order to combat
Note, A Hierarchical Recovery Approach: An Alternative Theory of Recovery Under Section
550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 213, 233 (1990); see also In re J.T.L.
Supermarket Corp., 145 B.R. 3,4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992).
279 Higgins & Peterson, supra note 268, at 390-91; Toth, supra note 268, at 1171-73.
280 0ne commentator has made the following remarks concerning the preference
period to one for creditors who hold insider guarantees:
But by limiting its inquiry to the words of section 550(a)(1) read in
isolation from the statutory structure, the literal approach does not
give effect to Congress's intent. The structure of relevant sections of
the Code, when viewed against the background of the legislative
history of section 550(a)(1) and the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, shows that Congress did not intend the result reached by
the literal approach.
Henk J. Brands, Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 530, 540 (1989).
28 1Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as Avoidable Preferences
in Bankruptcy: DePrizio and Its Aftermath, 23 UCC L. J. 115,128-29 (1990); Toth, supra note
268, at 1165-66.
2 82Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892, 903-05 (1982).
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this problem, Congress should continually review and revise the bankruptcy
laws so that they will not become antiquated.283 If the Code is going to be a
comprehensive code governing insolvency proceedings, then it is incumbent
upon Congress to insure that the Code does address the major insolvency
issues. If Congress fails to revise the bankruptcy laws, then Congress will be
remiss in its duty and it will be inviting the judiciary to rectify the problems
with the bankruptcy laws. Through inactivity Congress will be delegating its
authority to enact bankruptcy legislation to the judiciary. The legislative
process will be frustrated and the separation of powers doctrine thwarted.
V. PLAIN MEANING SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHEN THERE IS A PRECISE STATUTE
GOVERNING THE ISSUE, THE ISSUE IS A STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKRUPTCY LAW
ISSUE AND PUBLIC POLICY IS NOT INVOLVED
Plain meaning should be used only when there is a precise statute intended
to govern a straightforward bankruptcy issue and which does not entail public
policy. The more precise the statute then the more willing the judiciary should
be to enforce the express terms of the statute. As an honest agent, it is incumbent
upon the judiciary to enforce the terms of a statute. The more clearly a statute
has been drafted, the less opportunity the judiciary has to deviate from the
language of a statute. If the judiciary implements the text of a clear statute, then
there will be predictability and reliability, which is essential in the area of
bankruptcy and commercial law. Further, the enforcement of clearly drafted
bankruptcy statutes insures that the judiciary will enforce legislative contracts.
This will protect the different groups involved in the bankruptcy process
because each group has usually been involved in the enactment of legislation
that seeks to protect the particular interest group.
A court should review the pertinent legislative history to determine the
background surrounding the enactment of the particular legislation.284
Legislative history provides a context for the words used in the statute. The
court, also, should attempt to ascertain which interest groups were responsible
for the passage of the legislation, and what were the goals of the interest groups.
Reviewing the pertinent legislative history helps to insure that the legislative
contract will be enforced, and that the terms of the contract will not be
misconstrued. It should be noted, that sometimes legislative history will not
283 Under public choice theory, one would expect that interest groups would lobby
Congress to amend the bankruptcy laws to legislatively overrule poor or adverse
bankruptcy decisions. Indeed, interest groups have played a pivotal role in obtaining
the passage of most of the major amendments to the Code.
2841n 1984 Congress passed several major amendments to the Code; however, it failed
to prepare any committee reports concerning the meaning and purpose of the 1984
amendments. Peter B. Brandow, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Bankruptcy: Finding a Balance in 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1233, 1247-48
(1988); Gary M. Roberts, Note, Bankruptcy and the Union's Bargain: Equitable Treatment
of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1036 (1987). If legislative
history is going to have any utility, then Congress must be willing to provide thorough
reports concerning the legislation that it enacts.
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cast any light on an issue because the issue may be relatively recent and may
have never been contemplated by Congress.
A case that reflects the correct employment of the plain meaning rule and
strict statutory interpretation is Rake v. Wade.285 In Rake the debtors were in
arrears on long-term promissory notes, which had been assigned to the
respondent. The notes provided for a $5 charge for each missed payment;
however, the notes did not provide for interest on the arrearages. The notes
were secured by first mortgages on the debtors' residences. The value of each
of the residences exceeded the value of each of the notes; thus, the respondent
was an oversecured creditor.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to sections 506(b) and 1325(a)(5) an
oversecured mortgagee was entitled to postpetition interest on arrearages and
also that a residential mortgagee was entitled to postconfirmation interest on
the arrearages.286 The Court reasoned that section 506(b) permits an
oversecured creditor to receive postpetition interest.287 Section 1322(b)(5)
authorizes a debtor to cure a default concerning a residential mortgage.28 8
Section 1322(b)(5) is silent concerning whether a Chapter 13 plan may include
postpetition interest under section 506(b). 289 The Court employed holistic
statutory interpretation, and it construed sections 506(b) and 1322(b)(5) in a
manner that would give effect to both sections. 2 90 The Court, using the plain
285113 S. Ct. 2187 (1993).
28 61d. at 2189.
28 7The Court declared:
506(b) 'directs that postpetition interest be paid on all oversecured claims,'
... and, as the parties acknowledge, such interest accrues as part of the
allowed claim from the petition date until the confirmation or effective
date of the plan. The arrearages owed on the mortgages held by
respondent are plainly part of respondent's oversecured claims.
Under the unqualified terms of § 506(b), therefore, respondent is
entitled to preconfirmation interest on these arrearages. When statu-
tory language is dear, our "'sole function ... is to enforce it according
to its terms."'
Id. at 2191 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 239, 245 (1989)
(citations omitted)).
28 81d. at 2192.
28 91d.
29 0The Court stated:
We generally avoid construing one provision in a statute so as to suspend
or supersede another provision. To avoid 'deny[ing] effect to a part of a
statute,' we accord "'significance and effect.., to every word."'...
Construing §§ 506(b) and 1322(b)(5) together, and giving effect to both,
we conclude that § 1322(b)(5) authorizes a debtor to cure a default on a
home mortgage by making payments on arrearages under a Chapter 13
plan, and where the mortgagee's claim is oversecured, § 506(b) entitles
the mortgagee to preconfirmation interest on such arrearages.
Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2192 (quoting Ex parte Public Natl Bank, 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928)
(quoting Washington Market Co. v. Huffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879))).
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meaning method, also ruled that an oversecured mortgagee was entitled to
postconfirmation interest its arrearages under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 291
Section 1325(a)(5) applies to each secured claim provided for by a Chapter 13
plan.292 Under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), a mortgagee is entitled to the present
value of its claim, and therefore, postconfirmation interest is necessary to insure
that the payments under the plan will equal the present value of the
mortgagee's claim. 293 A debtor is entitled to split the claims of a residential
mortgagee into two components, the underlying debt and the arrearages. 294
The arrearages are part of a residential mortgagee's claim; therefore, they were
provided for under the Chapter 13 plan. 295 Thus, under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
a residential mortgagee is entitled to interest on the arrearages. 296
Rake reflects that debtor-creditor issues should be resolved first by examining
specific Code provisions. If a specific Code provision does not determine the
issue, then the issue should be decided by reaching a determination that is
harmonious with the Code and does not nullify any specific provision. Rake's
strength is that the Court enforced the Code according to the text of the statute.
The Court's method of resolving the issue produces reliability and
predictability because the answer to the questions lie in the text of the Code.
The Court's determination did not rest on the policy preferences of the
individual justices and did not entail unlimited discretion. Instead, the
resolution of the issue rested on the words that Congress used when it enacted
the particular piece of legislation. In addition, as Rake reflects, the strict
enforcement of debtor-creditor statutes insures that the judiciary will enforce
legislative contracts. 297 This is important in the context of the Code because the
statute is the product of interest group legislation and legislative compromises.
A case in which the Court incorrectly deviated from the plain meaning rule
is Dewsnup v. Timm. 298 In Dewsnup petitioner filed for Chapter 7. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed an adversary proceeding contending that the debt she owed to
the respondents exceeded the fair market value of the real property that secured
the debt. Therefore, the bankruptcy court should reduce the value of the lien
to the market value of the real property. The petitioner contended that under
11 U.S.C. § 506(a), the respondents would have only a secured claim to the
extent of the judicially determined value of their lien. In addition, pursuant to
2 9 1 1d.
292/d.
2 93 d. at 2192 n.8.
2 941d. at 2192.
2 95Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2193.
296/1/.
2 97 Public choice theory can only operate if the legislature is willing to enforce the
terms of a statute. If the judiciary is going to engage in policy making or equity, then
the legislative contract will be destroyed.
298112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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section 506(d),299 the bankruptcy court would be required to void the
remaining part of the lien because the remaining portion was not an allowed
secured claim within the meaning of section 506(a). The lower courts rejected
the petitioner's argument. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The issue
before the Court was whether, pursuant to section 506(d), a debtor may strip
down a creditor's lien on real property to the value of the collateral, when the
value of the collateral is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien?
The Court held that a debtor could not use section 506(d) to strip down the
value of the collateral, when a creditor had an allowed claim.300 The Court
reasoned that the term "allowed secured claim" in section 506(d) should not be
read in reference solely with section 506(a), but instead, should be read in
conjunction with section 502.301 Thus, in order for section 506(d) to become
operative, first the claim must be disallowed under section 502.302 The Court
accepted this argument because it thought that the statute was ambiguous and
it was also reluctant to deviate from pre-Code law.30 3 Under pre-Code law liens
passed through bankruptcy unaffected. 30 4 Further, excluding certain
reorganization provisions, no Bankruptcy Act statute permitted the reduction
of the value of a lien for any reason except payment of the underlying debt.30 5
When Congress enacted the Code it was aware of existing bankruptcy law, and
the Court thought it was unlikely that Congress would enact such a major
change without making its intent evident in either the legislative history or the
statute.36
299The relevant part of 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) states: "To the extent that a lien secured a
claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void..." 11
U.S.C. § 506(d).
300112 S. Ct. at 778.
30id. at 777.
3 021d.
30 3The Court stated:
Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with
petitioner that the words "allowed secured claim" must take the same
meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a). But, given the ambiguity in the text,
we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-
Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.
Id.
30 4Id.
305112 S. Ct. at 779.
30 6The Court declared:
Furthermore, this Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that
would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language
under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code
practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the
legislative history. Of course, where the language is unambiguous,
silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling. But, given the
ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to grant a debtor
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When sections 506(a) and 506(d) are read in conjunction they permit an
undersecured creditor's lien to be stripped. This is a natural reading of the two
Code Sections, and there is no ambiguity. The problem with Dewsnup is that
the Court departed from strict statutory interpretation because it did not like
the policy consequences that strict statutory construction would have
produced. There was no justification for deviating from the plain language of
the statute because the case did not involve public policy issues. The Court
engaged in judicial legislation, and therefore, it deprived Congress of its
authority to establish uniform laws concerning bankruptcy. Finally, the Court's
decision weakened the concept of predictability because the Court is willing to
rely upon pre-Code law in order to resolve a debtor-creditor issue.
A case in which the Supreme Court correctly departed from strict statutory
construction is Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection.307 In Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation (hereinafter Quanta)
processed waste oil at two facilities.308 The New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (hereinafter NJDEP) discovered that Quanta had
illegally dumped 400,000 of contaminated oil, and it ordered Quanta to cease
its operations. 309 Quanta and the NJDEP entered into negotiations concerning
the clean up of the site.310 But, before the negotiations were concluded Quanta
filed for Chapter 11.311 After Quanta filed for Chapter 11, an investigation
revealed that Quanta had also accepted and stored contaminated oil in its New
York site.312 The mortgages exceeded the value of the real property of the New
York site, and the estimated clean up rendered the property burdensome.313
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a),314 the trustee sought to abandon both sites.315
a new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become
'unsecured' for purposes of § 506(a) without the new remedy's being
mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress
is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to basic bankruptcy principles.
Id. (citations omitted).
307474 U.S. 494 (1986).
308Id.
309Id.
31OId.
3111d.
312Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 494.
313Id.
31 4Section 554(a) states:
After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
31SMidlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 494.
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The Court held that a trustee could not use section 554(a) to abandon
property in contravention of state laws designed to protect the public's health
and safety.316 Before the enactment of the Code, a trustee's authority to
abandon property was restricted to protect legitimate federal and state
interests.317 A trustee had to comply with applicable health and safety
regulations. 318 When Congress enacted section 554, it also presumably enacted
the restrictions that were associated with the power of abandonment.319 If
Congress had intended to change the rule it would have made its intent
known.3 20 If Congress, moreover, intended to grant a trustee "an extraordinary
exemption from nonbankruptcy law", then Congress would have clearly
expressed its intention.3 21 This is consistent with the structure of the Code that
places limitations on a trustee's powers. 322 Section 362(b)(5) and its legislative
history reflect that the state is authorized to sue a debtor for the violation of
environmental laws.323 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), 324 reflected that
Congress did not intend to preempt all state laws.325 Finally, Congress has
demonstrated a concern for the improper disposal of contaminated oil, and
therefore, it is unlikely that presume that it would approve of a trustee using
the abandonment power to abandon a toxic waste site.326
In Midlantic the majority reached the correct conclusion because this case did
not involve a debtor-creditor issue. Rather, Midlantic involved a significant
public policy issue: whether, under section 554(a), a trustee could abandon a
toxic waste site. The Court deviated from the express text of the statue because
the answer to the question was found in the policy rather than in the text of
section 554(a). Historically, a trustee was not permitted to abandon property of
3 16 d. at 502.
3 171d. at 500.
3 18 d. at 502.
3 191d. at 501.
3 20Midiantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 501.
3 211d.
322/d.
3231d. at 503-04.
324 Section 959(b) states:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager accord-
ing to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such
property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor
thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
325Midlan tic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 505.
3261d. at 505-06.
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the estate in contravention of state and federal health and safety laws.327
Abandonment was not intended to be used as a subterfuge to permit a debtor
to violate state and federal law. Indeed, different Code provisions reflect that a
debtor may not escape legitimate federal and state regulation by filing for
bankruptcy.328 The Code's legislative history also indicates that when a debtor
violates a state's environmental laws, the debtor will still be subject to
prosecution.329 The enforcement of state and regulatory laws is a fundamental
tenet underlying bankruptcy; therefore, the Court's analysis and holding in
Midlantic is correct.
VI. CONCLUSION
Strict statutory interpretation should be limited to those cases in which the
court is interpreting a precisely drafted debtor-creditor statute, which does not
entail public policy issues such as health or public safety. Through strict
statutory interpretation the court is able to enforce the legislative deals and
effectuate congressional intent by enforcing the language of the statute. Strict
statutory construction will also lead to predictability and reliability, and will
help to simplify-the law.
Courts should not use strict statutory interpretation when a public policy
issue is involved because blind adherence to a statute could produce
horrendous results. Under these circumstances, one can argue that Congress
did not anticipate that the statute would be used in this manner, and therefore,
deviating from the text of the statute does not thwart congressional intent.
Further, it can also be argued that the judiciary is only attempting to resolve
the issue in a manner that it thought Congress would have chosen if it had
anticipated the problem. Therefore, under these circumstances, deviating from
the text of a statute does not undermine legislative intent.
32 7A key aspect of the Midlantic opinion is that the Court engages in historic statutory
interpretation. The Court examined the historic evolution of abandonment as providing
a legislative history or context for interpreting § 554(a). The Court used the judicially
developed interpretation of abandonment to prevent a literalistic interpretation of
§ 554(a).
328 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4), (b)(5) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
329 H.R. REP. No. 595,95thCong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5838.
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